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THE NEW TERRORISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
Matthew Lippmant
On September 11, 2001, nineteen foreign nationals, operating as
separate terrorism teams, boarded and took control of four civilian
aircraft.1 Two of planes crashed into the twin towers of the World Trade
Center in New York and a third careened into the Pentagon in Arlington
Virginia.2 The passengers on a fourth realized that they were doomed to
die, resisted, and in the resulting struggle spiraled into a Pennsylvania
field.'
This kamikaze attack transformed the three aircraft and the 200,000
pounds of jet fuel into weapons of mass destruction and resulted in the
tragic death of as many as five thousand people The nominal head of the
Al Queda terrorist organization, Osama Bin Laden, later praised this
"good terror" and warned that the "battle has been moved inside
tProfessor, Department of Criminal Justice, University of Illinois at Chicago; J.D.,
American; Ph.D., Northwestern; LL.M., Harvard.
1. See Brian M. Jenkins, The Organization Men Anatomy Of A Terrorist Attack, in
How DID THIs HAPPEN? TERRORISM AND THE NEW WAR 1-2 (James F. Hoge, Jr. & Gideon
Rose eds., 2001) [hereinafter TERRORISM AND THE NEW WAR]. Bin Laden's organization
was responsible for the simultaneous suicide bombings of the United States embassies in
Kenya and Tanzania, in August 1998, which killed over two hundred people and injured
more than 5,000 as well as the suicide bombing of the USS Cole, in Yemen, in October
2000, which resulted in the death of seventeen sailors. Bin Laden was also connected to the
unsuccessful attempts to bomb the United States and Jordan during the millennium
celebrations and was linked to the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center. Another assault
seemingly connected to Bin Laden was the suicide truck bomb attack in 1996 on a United
States military's housing facility near Dhahran, Saudi Arabia which led to the death of
nineteen American servicemen. JEFFERY D. SIMON, THE TERRORIST TRAP: AMERICA'S
EXPERIENCE WITH TERRORISM, at xiv-xv (2d ed. 2001).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. William J. Perry, The New Security Mantra Prevention, Deterrence, Defense, in
TERRORISM AND THE NEW WAR, supra note 1, at 225.
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
America."5 He proclaimed that as a matter of divine dictate every
American constituted the enemy and was to be killed and plundered.6
The September 11th suicide attack on the United States is emblematic
of a new vicious variant of terrorism which threatens the safety and
security of the global community The modern version of this tactic of
suicide bombing was first deployed with devasting effect in the 1980's by
the fundamentalist Muslim Shi'ite organization, Hizballah, in Lebanon.!
Various secular pro-Syrian Lebanese groups then briefly flirted with this
technique and abandoned the terror tactic in 1986.' Suicide bombing
subsequently was adopted by Islamic groups in the West Bank, Gaza Strip,
and Israel and in Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Chechnya, Croatia,
Kashmir, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Pakistan, Panama, Sri Lanka
Tajikistan, Tanzania and Yemen.0  This tactic is not restricted to
religiously inspired movements. Over the last seventeen years the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka, a Tamil group
struggling for independence from the ruling Sinhalese majority, has been
responsible for 171 suicide attacks." It is increasingly clear that suicide
bombers are not limited to irrational and idiosyncratic individuals; the
5. Responsibility for the Terrorist Atrocities in the United States, 11 September 2001, An
Updated Account, para. 66 (Nov. 14, 2001), at http://www.nunber-10.gov.uk/output/
page3863.asp (last visited Jan. 27, 2003).
6. Id. para. 22. See Bernard Lewis, License to Kill, 77 FOREIGN AFF., Nov.-Dec. 1998,
at 14; Michael Scott Doran, Somebody Else's Civil War, in TERRORISM AND THE NEW WAR,
supra note 1, at 31.
7. See WALTER LAOUEUR, THE NEW TERRORISM FANATICISM AND THE ARMS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION (1999). The assassins were a twelfth century Islamic sect which engaged in
assassination as religious ritual. See BERNARD LEWIS, THE ASSASSINS: A RADICAL SECT IN
ISLAM (1967).
8. Ariel Merari, The Readiness to Kill and Die: Suicidal Terrorism in the Middle East, in
ORIGINS OF TERRORISM PSYCHOLOGIES, IDEOLOGIES, THEOLOGIES, STATES OF MIND 192
(Walter Reich ed. 1998) (1990) [hereinafter ORIGINS OF TERRORISM]. Hizballah suicide
bombings included the United States embassy in Beirut on April 18, 1983, resulting in 80
dead and 142 wounded; the United States Marine headquarters in Beirut on October 23,
1983, leading to 273 dead and 81 wounded and the concurrent attack on the headquarters
of the French paratroopers resulting in 58 dead and 15 wounded; the Israeli government
building in Tyre on November 4, 1983, leaving 88 dead and 69 wounded; and the American
embassy in Kuwait on December 12, 1983, resulting in 4 dead and 15 wounded. Id. at 203.
There, of course, is a lengthy list of historical antecedents. See Ehud Sprinzak, Rational
Fanatics, FOREIGN POL'Y, Sept.-Oct. 2000, at 66, 68.
9. Merari, supra note 8, at 204.
10. Nasra Hassan, An Arsenal Of Believers, THE NEW YORKER, Nov. 19,2001, at 36, 38.
11. Sprinzak, supra note 8, at 69. See LAQUEUR, supra note 7, at 191-96 (discussing the




ranks of bombers include intellectually and emotionally aware and alert
individuals 2 who have been socialized into a collective culture of rapacity
and revenge." Each death sets a standard of sacrifice as the touchstone of
commitment to a cause.14
This is a tactic which demands relatively simple strategic scheming,
training and resources; a single bomber strapped with a modest cache of
explosives is able to penetrate the most formidable defense perimeter and
inflict death and depredation on innumerable innocents. 5 The attacks are
unpredictable and splinter a society into suspicion, fear and distrust; even a
bomb which prematurely ignites serves to symbolize the continuing
combustible threat.1 6  Suicide bombing evidences an intimidating
commitment to a cause and prevents the perpetrator from being subject to
interrogation or public parade. 7 The suicide bomber now has evolved into
the weapon of the militarily overmatched. Dr. Ramadan Shalah, former-
Secretary-General of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, explained that:
Our enemy possesses the most sophisticated weapons in the world and its
army is trained to a very high standard. We have nothing with which to
repel killing and thuggery against us except the weapon of martyrdom. It
is easy and costs us only our lives ... human bombs cannot be defeated,
not even by nuclear bombs.1 8
The attack of September 11, 2001 was distinguished by the fact that
the most prominent attackers were older, better educated and more
cosmopolitan than the typical suicide bomber.1 9 There were only loose
relationships among the hijackers and the communal coercion, which was
thought essential to creating a culture of death.2' The potency of the
hijackers' ideological indoctrination and commitment was sufficiently
powerful to sustain them throughout a relatively lengthy stay amidst the
21
materialism and mesmerizing marvels of the United States.
12. See Hassan, supra note 10, at 38.
13. See Joseph Lelyveld, All Suicide Bombers Are Not Alike, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2001,
at 49, 50. See generally Scott Anderson, The Hunger Warriors, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21. 2001, at
43.
14. Lelyveld, supra note 13, at 50.
15. Sprinzak, supra note 8, at 66-67.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 68.
19. Jenkins, supra note 1, at 8.
20. Id. at 7.
21. Id. It previously was thought that only the socially disadvantaged with limited
aspirations would engage in suicide attacks, and that there was a need to provide constant
2003]
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Other terrorist attacks pale in comparison to September 11, 2001 . In
the past, terrorist assaults were directed at targets which were related to a
group's philosophy and objectives; indiscriminate violence might diminish
the terrorists' image and support, create internal schisms and risk a harsh
counter-reaction.23 However, in this period of prodigious violence, only
the spectacular was likely to mesmerize the media. 4 In addition, the
hijackers viewed themselves as divinely ordained to cleanse the cosmos of
the corrupt and contemptible and clearly were not constrained by either
conscience or constituency. The terrorists' simultaneous attack on targets
had few precedents." Their coordinated callous campaign enabled these
furious fanatics to achieve results comparable to those which would result
from the deployment of weapons of mass destruction." Combating attacks
such as those of September 11, 2001 are complicated by the autonomous,
multinational and decentralized nature of contemporary terrorist cells
which coalesce and converge to conduct specific missions and then
separate and splinter.28
Terrorist suicide bombings which possess a transnational dimension
contravene the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist
Bombings and other instruments.'9 This Bombing Convention requires
signatory States to penalize and to punish individuals" delivering, placing,
discharging or detonating an explosive or other lethal device in, into or
encouragement and support in order to sustain their psychological propensity to engage in
a suicide attack. Id.
22. Id. at 4. More than 10,000 international terrorist incidents have been recorded since
1968 and only 14, prior to September 11, 2001, resulted in 100 or more fatalities. These
included 325 deaths in an Air Indian crash in 1985; 300 killed in 1993 as a result of car
bombs in Bombay; 270 deaths in the 1988 crash of Pan Am 103; 241 killed in a 1983 truck
bomb in Beirut; 171 in a 1989 French plane crash; 168 dead from a truck bomb attack in
Oklahoma City in 1995; and 115 killed in the 1987 bombing of a Korean airliner. Id.
23. Id. at 5.
24. Id.
25. Jenkins, supra note 1, at 5.
26. Id. at 6. Ramzi Yousef, the man behind the first World Trade Center bombing,
conspired to bring down twelve airliners in 1994. In 1998, members of Al Oueda
simultaneously attacked two American embassies. Id.
27. See JESSICA STERN, THE ULTIMATE TERRORISTS (Harvard Univ. Press 1999) (2000).
28. See Jenkins, supra note 1, at 8.
29. International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, Dec. 15, 1997,
S. TREATY Doc. No. 106-6, 37 I.L.M. 249 [hereinafter Terrorist Bombings]. The acts of
September 11, 2001 also appear to be in direct defiance of the Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, 24 U.S.T. 564, 1971
U.N. Jurid. Y.B. 143 (1971) [hereinafter Montreal Convention].
30. Terrorist Bombings, supra note 29, art. 4.
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against a place of public use, a State or government facility, a public
transportation system or an infrastructure facility.31 These acts are to be
criminalized when committed with the intent to cause death, or serious
- • 32
injury or to cause extensive destruction in those instances in which this
destruction results in or is likely to result in major economic IOSS.33 The
seriousness with which terrorist bombings is treated in the Convention is
clear from the obligation of the State Party on whose territory the alleged
perpetrator is present to either extradite or to prosecute the offender.3
States Parties are required to enact domestic legislation to punish acts
prohibited under the Convention in accordance with their "grave nature,"
particularly where intended or calculated to provoke a "state of terror"
and under no circumstances may such bombings be considered "justifiable
by considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethic,
religious or other similar nature."35
Middle Eastern terrorists view suicide bombers as acts of martyrdom
and as "sacred explosions" which are carried out as an expression of their
sacred duty to carry out divine acts of self-determination and resistance to
State repression of human and equal rights." They point to the killing of
innocents by well-armed and equipped State authorities37 as constituting• 38
the true acts of terrorism. There seems to be an inevitable pattern of
endless and escalating State repression in the face of suicide bombing
which, in turn, encourages an increasingly large number of individuals to
enlist as martyrs to the cause of combating the infidels of the Great
Satan.3 9 Most disconcerting is the fact that few of the policy prescriptions
proposed by government officials to combat suicide terrorism appear to
have enhanced safety and security.
31. Id. art. 2, para. 1.
32. Id. art. 2, para. 1(a).
33. Id. art. 2, para. 1(b).
34. Id. art. 8.
35. Id. art. 5.
36. See Lelyveld, supra note 13; Terrorist Bombings, supra note 29, art. 19, para. 1.
Article 19 provides that the Convention shall not affect the rights of individuals and States
under international law, in "particular the purposes and principles of the Charter of the
United Nations and international humanitarian law." Id. The Charter of the United
Nations recognizes among its purposes respect for equal rights and self-determination of
peoples, and respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms. U.N. CHART[ER art. 1,
paras. 2-3.
37. Hassan, supra note 10, at 38. At the publication of Hassan's article, an estimated
215 Israelis had been killed in these explosions and 1,800 had been injured. Id.
38. id.
39. Id. at 38-40.
40. Cf Spinzak, supra note 8, at 72-3.
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This is the new clerical culture of death and destruction.41 September
11, 2001 was only the first phase; Attorney General John Ashcroft
announced, in January 2000, that videotapes were discovered in
Afghanistan displaying martyrdom messages from five suicide terrorists
42 mnh
who may have entered the United States. Four months later, Robert S.
Mueller III, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, warned that
the same types of suicide bombings which occurred in Israel were
"inevitable" in the continental United States.43 A number of issues are
presented by suicide bombers. Are suicide bombers, most appropriately
viewed as terrorists, common criminals, religious or ideological martyrs or
freedom fighters? Can the murder and maiming of civilians be justified?
Are there true innocents in what is viewed by militants as a struggle for
human rights and self-determination? Should a relaxed and generous legal
standard be applied to combatants engaged in internationally recognized
struggles for freedom? Are those involved in the bombings who are
apprehended best treated as penal perpetrators, political offenders or
prisoners of war? This essay sketches the development and philosophy of
the new terrorism which is epitomized by suicide bombers. Three distinct
phases in the developing international legal regulation of terrorism then
are chronicled and critiqued.
I. THE NEW TERRORISM
The contemporary era has ushered in a "new terrorism." 44 Terrorist
groups, in the past, generally possessed coherent ideological platforms and
aspirations and selected targets which advanced and symbolized these
goals.45 They were sensitive to the need to maintain political legitimacyS46
and avoided intentionally targeting innocents. The "new terrorists," in
41. See Martin Kramer, The Moral Logic of Hizballah, in ORIGINS OF TERRORISM supra
note 8, at 131, 141-57.
42. David Johnston, U.S. Hunts 5 Men Seen on Tape, Saying They May Plan Attack,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2002, at Al.
43. Philip Shenon, Suicide Attacks Certain in U.S., Mueller Warns, N.Y. TIMES, May 21,
2002, at Al. A Palestinian immigrant was convicted of attempting to ignite a nail-studded
bomb in the New York City subway in 1991, which would have been the first suicide
bombing in the United States. Id. at A16.
44. See IAN 0. LESSER ET AL., COUNTERING THE NEW TERRORISM (1999) [hereinafter
THE NEW TERRORISM].
45. Bruce Hoffman, Terrorism Trends and Prospects, in THE NEw TERRORISM, supra
note 44, at 7, 8-10.
46. Jenkins, supra note 1, at 9. In Northern Ireland, between 1969 and 1993, fewer than
twenty percent of the victims of the Irish Republican Army, were Protestant civilians; in
Spain, more than sixty percent of the deaths resulting from the activities of the Basque
[Vol. 10.2
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contrast, are driven by an apocalyptic and millenarian religiously-based
worldview which posits that the world must be destroyed in order to
cleanse the globe of paganism and impurity.4' This predisposes
contemporary terrorists to develop and to deploy nuclear, biological and
chemical weapons (NBC) of mass destruction (WMD),4 which are
increasingly available in the global marketplace.4 9 The trend is towards
increasingly lethal terrorist incidents and an escalating number of
fatalities5 0 This is encouraged by the enhanced technological sophistication
of terrorists" who increasingly are drawn from the ranks of amateur
attackers who lack the capacity to carefully calibrate and to control the
consequences of their violent conduct. 2
The spectacular incident also has become the currency of the
contemporary terrorists who are caught in a spiral of ever-more dramatic
acts of violence to attract media and public attention and to draw the
young and impressionable to their ranks. 3 The tightly organized,
hierarchical terrorist organization has been replaced by fluid, decentralized
and specialized cells which temporarily cooperate and coalesce around
particular projects.5 The individuals involved often lack clear
organizational identities and increasingly fail to claim credit or to offer an
explanation for the attack.5" Terrorists also increasingly transcend national
boundaries and rely on technology to coordinate and cooperate in their
separatist group, ETA, were members of the Spanish security forces. BRUCE HOFFMAN,
INSIDE TERRORISM 162 (Columbia University Press 1999) [hereinafter INSIDE TERRORISM].
47. Hoffman, supra note 45, at 19-20.
48. See STERN, supra note 27. The first modern religiously motivated terrorist groups
did not appear until 1980, accounting for two of the sixty-four active groups. Hoffman,
supra note 45, at 17. In 1995, these groups accounted for nearly half (26% or 46%) of the
fifty-six known terrorist groups. Id. Groups motivated in part or in whole by a religious or
theological motivation committed ten of the thirteen highly visible terrorist acts committed
in 1996. Id. Shi'a Islamic groups committed eight percent of all recorded terrorist incidents
between 1982 and 1989, but were responsible for nearly thirty percent of deaths during this
period. Id.
49. See Hoffman, supra note 45, at 30.
50. Id. at 12-13. Fourteen percent of all incidents in 1991 resulted in terrorist incidents.
This rose to twenty-nine percent in 1995. A relatively small number of incidents accounted
for these fatalities. These are termed terrorist "spectaculars." Id. at 12.
51. Id. at 29. Commonly available material, such as fertilizer, diesel fuel and icing sugar
are able to inflict enormous damage when deployed by experienced operatives. Id.
52. Id. at 20-21. These individuals are difficult to profile and detect. See id.
53. Id. at 13.
54. Jenkins, supra note 1, at 11.
55. Hoffman, supra note 45, at 9.
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operations and to carry out operations across the globe." Terrorist groups
also rely on a far-flung, sophisticated and difficult to penetrate
international financial networks which involve cooperation with drug
cartels and petty criminals and other illegitimate enterprises as well as with
legitimate charitable organizations, mining interests, currency traders and
businesses. 7
This new terrorism also is associated with the advent of the "super-
terrorist, individuals characterized by a megalomaniacal desire to leave
a historically unprecedented mark of mass devastation and death. 9 These
pernicious personalities are distinguished by a fascination with
technological innovation and implementation rather than by a strong
commitment to a political cause. 6' Destruction rather than doctrine is the
animating aspect of their activity.61 The sadistic "super-terrorist" thus
belies the conventional conception of terrorists as reasonable and rationale
individuals who have adopted violent tactics in order to achieve limited
62political objectives.
This new terrorism is typified by Osama Bin Laden.63 Bin Laden
initially centered his calumny on the presence of United States troops on
the soil of Saudi Arabia which, in his view, typified the Saudi regime's
retreat from the proper Islamic path.64 He called upon Muslims to expel
56. See John Arquilla et al., Networks, Netwar, and Information-Age Terrorism, in THE
NEW TERRORISM, supra note at 44.
57. See William F. Wechsler, Strangling The Hydra: Targeting Al Queda's Finances, in
TERRORISM AND THE NEW WAR, supra note 1, at 129.
58. Cf Ehud Sprinzak, The Great Superterrorism Scare, 113 FOR. POL'Y, Fall 1998, at 11.
59. Ehud Sprinzak, The Lone Gunmen The Global War on Terrorism Faces a New
Brand of Enemy, FOR. POL'Y, Nov.-Dec. 2001, available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/
issuenovdec 2001/sprinzakhyper.html, at 1 (last visited Feb. 1, 2003).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See Martha Crenshaw, The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of
Strategic Choice, in ORIGINS OF TERRORISM, supra note 8, at 7. The "new terrorism" was
implicitly discussed by George J. Tenet, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency in
testimony before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee in February 2002. See Words of
the C.I.A., Chief on Terror, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7,2002, at Al.
63. See PETER L. BERGEN, HOLY WAR INC.: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF OSAMA BIN
LADEN (Touchstone Books 2002).
64. See Osama Bin Laden, Declaration of War Against the Americans Occupying the
Land of the Two Holy Places (Expel the Infidels from the Arab Peninsula): A Message from
Usama Bin Muhammad Bin Laden to his Muslim Brethren All Over the World Generally
and in the Arab Peninsula Specifically (Aug. 1996), at http://www.terrorism files.org/indivi




65the Americans from the Arab peninsula. In February 1998, Bin Laden
launched a global campaign of terror against the United States and her
allies." This pronouncement was issued under the sponsorship of the
World Islamic Front, a coalition of Bin Laden and four fundamentalist
leaders from Egypt, Pakistan and Bangladesh.6' Their status as self-
proclaimed universal spokesmen was further inflated by audaciously
characterizing the statement as a Fatwa, or a religious edict issued by
learned and respected religious scholars.68 The Fatwa also boldly
connected the contemporary struggle to the challenges which confronted
the founding fathers of Islam and portrayed the current struggle in cosmic
and consequential terms.69
The Fatwa initially referenced a Koranic injunction to "'slay the
pagans" and cited a statement by the Prophet Muhammad to wage war on
those who do not worship the one true God.70 This was an effort to
connect Bin Laden to the Prophet Muhammad who preached Islam to the
pagan Arab tribes in Mecca and who then was forced to flee to Medina in
622 A.D.7 The Prophet returned with his small and poorly appointed
band of followers and subdued the pagans and initiated the struggle to
spread Islam across the globe.72 Bin Laden characterized the contemporary
struggle as a continuation of this campaign against non-believers and
stressed that the Arab Peninsula "has never" since created by God "been
stormed by any forces like the crusader armies spreading in it like locusts,
eating its riches and wiping out its plantations."73 His characterization of
America and her European allies as "crusaders" was an obvious reference
65. Id. The Saudi Arabian government later expelled Bin Laden from the country.
BERCEN, supra note 63, at 78-79.
66. World Islamic Front, God's Order To Kill Americans, in EXTRFME ISLAM ANTI-
AMERICAN PROPAGANDA OF MUSLIM FUNDAMENTALISM 290 (Adam Parfrey ed. 2001).
This is analyzed in Bernard Lewis, License to Kill, 77 FOREIGN AFF., Nov.-Dec. 1968, at 14.
See also Doran, supra note 6, at 22.
67. World Islamic Front, supra note 66, at 290. The signatories were Osama Bin Laden,
Ayman al-Zawahiri, Amir of the Jihad Group in Egypt; Abu-Yasir Rifa'I Ahmad Taha of
the Egyptian Islamic Group; Shaykh Mir Hamzah, Secretary of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-E-
Pakistan; and Fazlur Rahman, Amir of the Jihad Movement in Bangladesh. Id.
68. Id. See Lewis, supra note 66, at 15.
69. World Islamic Front, supra note 66, at 290.
70. Id.
71. Doran, supra note 6, at 33-34.
72. Id.
73. World Islamic Front, supra note 66, at 290. The statement that this was the worst
development in Arabia minimized a number of catastrophic events that occurred over the
past 1,300 years. In 1258, the Mongol leader Hulegu ravished Bagdhad, killed the caliph
and massacred hundreds of thousands. Doran, supra note 6, at 37.
20031
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to the Christian campaigns of Middle Eastern conquest during the
eleventh, twelfth and thirteenth centuries which Bin Laden considered to
71be continuing into the contemporary era.
The Fatwa enumerated three grievances. First, the positioning of
American troops in Saudi Arabia, home of two of the holiest Islamic
sites. 5 Second, the bombing and continuing sanctions imposed on Iraq,
which Bin Laden alleged resulted in the death of over one million people."
In addition to these alleged religious and economic transgressions, Bin
Laden charged that American policy advanced the interests of the Jewish
State of Israel while demonstrating little concern over the occupation of
Jerusalem and the murder of Muslims.77 The Fatwa asserted that the
United States' commitment to the survival and sustenance of Israel was the
rationale for America's continuing effort to fragment and weaken Iraq,
Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Sudan.78 Bin Laden denounced the United
States' "crimes and sins" as a declaration of war on God and the Prophet
Muhammad and claimed that Muslims possessed a duty to fight against the
infidel invaders. 9
Muslims thus were enjoined to "kill" Americans and their allies in
order to liberate the holy lands. 0 The Fatwa urged the followers of Islam
to "'fight the pagans"' until "'there is no more tumult or oppression"' and
"'justice and faith"' prevail."' The United States, in Bin Laden's view, was
not only benighted, it was "Satan," the tempter and corrupter of culture. 
2
Martyrdom and a preferred place in heaven awaited those who embraced
the defense of Islam and complied with "God's order to kill the Americans
and plunder their money wherever and whenever they find it.""3
74. Lewis, supra note 66, at 17-18.
75. World Islamic Front, supra note 66, at 290. In 641, the "Caliph Umar decreed that
Jews and Christians should be removed from Arabia" pursuant to the Prophet's injunction
on the Prophet's deathbed that there should not be "'two religions in Arabia."' Lewis,
supra note 66, at 16.
76. World Islamic Front, supra note 66, at 291. Bin Laden alleged that despite these





81. Id. at 292.
82. World Islamic Front, supra note 66. See Doran, supra note 6, at 36.
83. World Islamic Front, supra note 66.
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Bin Laden later expressed gratitude to God for the success of the
September 11, 2002 attack on the United States.8 He proclaimed that this
was retribution for the humiliation suffered by the Muslim nation over the
past eighty years." Bin Laden dismissed those Muslims who continued to
support the United States as "hypocrites" and "apostates," an allusion to
individuals who betrayed the Islamic religion. 86 The statement pointed out
that the United States, while professing to be opposed to terrorism,
dropped a nuclear bomb on Japan which exterminated hundreds of
thousands; and also killed a million people in Iraq.87 Yet, Bin Laden noted
that the Americans complained when "a few more than 10 were killed in
Nairobi and Dar es Salaam [capitals of Kenya and Tanzania, where the
American Embassies were bombed in 1998]." He concluded that
America now stands weak, vulnerable and reviled by the world.89 The
"blessed" action of September 11, 2002 against America was carried out by
nineteen young men; a clear reference to the Prophet Muhammad and his
small band of followers who, despite their youth and limited resources,
vanquished the mighty forces of Mecca. 9°
The world, according to Bin Laden, stands divided between faith and
infidelity and Muslims "must rise" to defend the faith.9 He vowed that
"America will not live in peace before peace reigns in Palestine, and
before all the army of infidels depart the land of Muhammad, peace be
upon him.
92
84. Bin Laden's Statement: 'The Sword Fell,' N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2001, at B7 [hereinafter
The Sword].
85. Id. The eighty year reference appears to refer to the dismantling of the Ottoman
Empire. See Doran, supra note 6, at 49.
86. The Sword, supra note 84. Hypocrites refers to those who embraced Islam and then
deserted the Prophet Muhammad during battle. Those who desert the Islam faith are
apostates-a dire offense against Islam. See Doran, supra note 66, at 34.
87. The Sword, supra note 84.
88. Id. Bin Laden later argued that only seven grams of explosives were needed to kill
an individual, but that the United States utilized bombs weighing seven million grams
during the Afghan campaign, attesting to America's hatred of the Taliban and Muslims.
Yet, when the United States embassy in Nairobi was blown apart with less than two tons,
the United States alleged that it was a terrorist act while "it unscrupulously used two bombs
of seven million grams each." 'God Willing; America's End Is Near,' N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28,
2001, at B2 (statement of Osama Bin Laden).
89. The Sword, supra note 84.
90. Id. See Doran, supra note 6, at 34.
91. The Sword, supra note 84.
92. Id.
2003]
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Bin Laden's grievances are a manifestation of what he views as a clash
of civilizations which threatens to extinguish Islam.93 The Muslim world,
according to Bin Laden, is in the death grip of European civilization and
culture and there can be neither negotiation nor compromise; murder,1 4
maiming and mayhem are acts of self-defense rather than terrorism. As
for those who contend that these operations "are not permissible," they
are "expressing the wishes of the tyrants, the United States and its
agents." 95 Bin Laden proclaimed that Muslims possessed a duty to defend
themselves by acquiring weapons of mass destruction.96
In the end, Bin Laden's is a utopian philosophy with little thought
devoted to the map of the future; he contended that only Afghanistan
under the rule of the Taliban was a truly Islamic State.97 There is little
distinction in his thought other than the advocacy of a global Jihad against
the United States as a tactic for dividing the Islamic and Western worlds
and weakening and ultimately overthrowing existing Middle Eastern
regimes. 9 The psychology profile of Osama Bin Laden would prove too
terrifyingly typical of contemporary terrorists.
II. SUICIDE BOMBERS; DIVINE MARTYRS
The fundamentalist Shi'ite Muslim organization, Hizballah, or the
party of God, launched suicide attacks which drove the United States,
France and Israel out of Lebanon.99 These attacks included the suicidal
bombing of the American embassy in Beirut, in April 1983, which left 80
dead and 142 wounded; and the assault on the United States Marine
installation in Beirut, in October 1983, which resulted in 273 dead and 81
wounded along with the concurrent attack on the headquarters of the
93. See SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATION AND THE REMAKING OF
WORLD ORDER (1996),
94. See The Sword, supra note 84.
95. Id.
96. See Osama Bin Laden V. The U.S.; Edicts And Statements, at http://wwwpbs.org
/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/who/edicts.htm (PBS Frontline, Hunting Bin Laden,
December 23, 1998 interview with Time Magazine).
97. See Hamid Mir, Osama Claims He has Nukes: If U.S. Uses N-arms It Will Get Same
Response, Nov. 10, 2002, at http://www.dawn.com/2001/11/10/topl.htm.
98. See GILLES KEPEL, JIHAD: THE TRAIL OF POLITICAL ISLAM (Anthony F. Roberts
trans., 2000).
99. See Merari, supra note 8, at 192. The Japanese kamikaze pilots attacked American
ships during World War It. See EDWIN P. HoYT, THE KAMIKAZES SUICIDE SQUADRONS OF
WORLD WAR 11 (1983).
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French paratroopers with the attendant killing of 58 and wounding of 15. 00
This tactic subsequently was adopted by Shi'ite and Syrian nationalist
101
groups.
The spiritual leader of Hizballah, Ayatollah Sayyid Muhammad
1012Husayn Fadlallah, found suicide bombing problematic in light of the
Islamic prohibition against suicide.10 3 Others expressed concern that this
terror tactic diverted attention from the political purpose underlying the
attacks and invited speculation as to the possibly perverted psychological
profile of Islamic militants. °4
In 1985, Fadlallah endorsed suicide bombing while avoiding the
issuance of a formal Fatwa.15 He proclaimed that Muslims lacked the
resources to confront the massive and sophisticated forces of the United
States and Israel and were justified in utilizing "'primitive and
unconventional means'" in self-defense.0 6  These bombings, when
undertaken in defense of Islam, constituted Jihad, or religious struggle,
rather than terrorism. °7 Fadlallah was not content to base his rationale
solely on exigent circumstances. He noted that suicide bombers were
indistinguishable from armed combatants who confronted overwhelming
force and were certain to die after killing enemy forces.'08 Others extended
Fadlallah's analysis and proclaimed that those who acted to protect and to
preserve Islam would be rewarded in paradise.0 Some continued to insist
that recognition of martyrdom required a formal legal ruling in a Fatwa.110
The evacuation of Western forces led Fadlallah to qualify his defense
of suicide bombing."' He ruled that these operations could only justified
100. Merari, supra note 8, at 203. A November 1983 attack on the Israeli government
building in Tyre left eighty-eight dead and sixty-nine wounded and an attack on the
American embassy in Kuwait, in December 1983, resulted in four dead and fifteen
wounded. Id. Thirty-one cases of suicidal bombing occurred between 1983 and 1986. In
two additional instances, the perpetrators were caught or escaped before conducting the
suicide mission. Id.
101. Id. at 204. Only seven of the thirty-one incidents were perpetrated by
fundamentalist Shit'ites. Id.
102. Martin Kramer, The Moral Logic of Hizballah, in ORIGINS OF TERRORISM, supra
note 8, at 131, 139.
103. Id. at 142.
104. Id. at 143.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 145.
107. Id.
108. Kramer, supra note 102, at 145.
109. Id. at 147.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 148.
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where compelling military or political purposes justified the sacrifice of
human life and injury and damage to property."2 Suicide bombing could
not be utilized to achieve modest or limited aspirations; there must be
proportionality between the death of the bombers and the aims of the
mission.' 3 These attacks were abandoned by 1985 and were viewed as a
historical idiosyncrasy which was unlikely to be repeated, however,
Lebanese clerics warned that this technique would once again be utilized
in the event of renewed Western aggression."4
Roughly twenty-five years later, suicide bombing was adopted as a
• * 115
tactic by Palestinians militants. The death toll from this terror tactic rose
from 1 in 2000 to 88 in 2001 and to 176 during the first three months of
2002. 16 As of March 30, 2002, there had been seventy suicide attacks
during the previous twenty-one months."7 These bombings became
increasingly lethal as crudely devised munitions comprised of fertilizer and118
sugar were replaced by sophisticated instruments composed of military-
grade explosives which contained longer and better-packed nails.119 A
March 27, 2002 attack in the seaside resort of Netanya over the Jewish
Passover holiday killed twenty-six and nearly destroyed the dining room of
a hotel while an assault in Haifa four days later killed fifteen and blew the
roof off a restaurant. These attacks were carried out by variousPalestinian political factions which viewed their willingness to carry out
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Kramer, supra note 102, at 149.
115. See Serge Schmemann, In the Arabs' Struggle Against Israel, There Are Many
Players, N.Y. TIMES, March 30, 2002, at A6.
116. James Bennet, Jerusalem Toll, June 19, 2002, at Al.
117. John Kifner & Joel Greenberg, A Morning Commute Is Transformed Into a
Shattering Blood Bath, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2002, at A10. This presumably does not
include individuals apprehended prior to an attack. Israel reported that there were 140
"would-be suicide bombers" in custody. John Kifner, Israeli Court Upholds Blowing Up
Houses, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2002, at A6. Another report determined that from 1993 until
late September 2000, there were sixty-one attempted and successful suicide attacks while
from the late September until mid-June, 2002, there were 116 attempted bombings and
bombings. James Bennet, Rash of New Suicide Bombers Showing No Pattern or Ties, N.Y.
TIMES, June 21, 2002, at Al.
118. Schmemann, supra note 115.
119. Douglas Frantz, More Firepower For Palestinians, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2002, at Al.
There was some traces of toxic chemical, possibly a pesticide or rat poison. Clyde
Haberman, Toxic Traces After Bombing Add to Jitters Of Israelis, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12,
2001, at All.
120. Frantz, supra note 119, at A12.
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suicide attacks as the touchstone of their credibility and political
commitment.
21
The bombings in areas crammed with civilians were particularly
devastating: In June 2002, a suicide attacker ignited a bomb packed with
ball bearings and metal marbles on a crowded rush hour Jerusalem bus.
The explosive peeled back the top of the bus and left the vehicle on its
side, burned and blackened. 23 The New York Times reported that the
bodies of three headless women and student backpacks were strewn in
seats, arms and legs were scattered around the bus and blood stained the
road under the back door.2 4 Observers described an explosion, screaming,
shattered glass and witnessing bodies flung in the air.'25 An earlier January
attack in Jerusalem at the intersection of George and Jaffa Street, the site
of eight bombings or shootings in the previous sixteen months, left 113
wounded. 126 A police officer reported that he "'saw a body with a leg
missing. There was also a head, which did not belong to that body .... [the
body] was in flames.'"1 27 In early December 2002, two Palestinians ignited
bombs at either end of a pedestrian mall, killing at least ten and wounding
countless others."' These were the third and fourth explosions within a
week." 9 This area was the target of a renewed suicide attack, on August 9,
2002, when a bomb was ignited at a nearby restaurant.12 ) A witness
recounted hearing a loud boom and peering out the window at people
"'flying through the air."' 131 The New York Times reported that bombs
packed with nuts and screws scattered "limbs and chunks of flesh across
the paving stones, amid fragmented glass, shredded clothing, and
mannequins from a women's clothing store. The air smelled of burned
flesh and blood was spattered more than 20 feet up, above the shattered
windows of a shop selling postcards and shirts."'32 One witness reported
121. Schmemann, supra note 115.
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"'people laying on the floor, gushing-people without feet.', 1 33 Another
saw "'a lot of blood, everyone was screaming. I saw three people with their
heads open."" 34 On March 2, 2002, a suicide bomber attacked an ultra-
orthodox Jerusalem neighborhood killing at least nine individuals as they
walked home from evening services.35 A witness ran through the streets
searching for her son and reported seeing "'a huge ball of fire and horrific
black smoke . . . [she witnessed] sights unimaginable in their horror,"'
including the charred corpse of an infant and the body of another child
who lost a portion of a leg."'
In April 2002, Suha al-Taweel Arafat, who is married to Yasar Arafat,
head of the Palestinian Authority, endorsed suicide attacks as a legitimate
weapon of resistance against Israeli occupation.1 3 ' Arafat proclaimed that
she would consider it an honor to sacrifice a son to the Palestinian cause.138
Sheik Muhammad Sayyed Tantawi, a leading religious scholar at the
University of Cairo, stated that carrying out suicide attacks was "'an
Islamic commandment until the people of Palestine regain their land and
cause the cruel Israeli aggression to retreat.'' 139 Dr. Ahmad Al Tayyeb,
Egypt's highest religious jurist, declared that the "'proliferation of suicide
attacks' which 'strike horror into the hearts of the enemies of Allah"' is
the solution to Israeli terror. Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi, a leader of the
militant, fundamentalist Palestinian Hamas faction, warned that so long as
the Israelis were "'assassinating our people, our women and our children"'
that they would "'pay a price for every crime they commit' in "'Tel Aviv
or Jerusalem or anywhere else in Israel.' ,1
4 1
Boaz Ganor, Executive Director of the Institute for Counter-
Terrorism in Israel, identified the underlying motives of suicide bombers
as the fulfillment of the theological command of Jihad, or "Holy War,',
42
133. Id.
134. Bennet & Greenberg, supra note 128.
135. James Bennet, In Jerusalem, Suicide Bomber Kills at Least 9, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3,
2002, at Al.
136. Id. at A10.
137. Judith Miller, In Interview, Arafat's Wife Praises Suicide Bombings, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
15, 2002, at Al.
138. Id.
139. Id. He later clarified that suicide bombing only was permissible when directed
against soldiers. Id.
140. Id.
141. Tim Golden, Fear and Rage in Gaza and Threats by Hamas: Public Braces for
Possible Israeli Attack, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2002, at A8.
142. Boaz Ganor, Suicide Terrorism: an Overview (Feb. 15, 2000), at http://www.ict.org.il
/articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=128 (last visited Jan. 21, 2003).
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and explained that the bombers were considered martyrs (shaheed) who
were provided an eternal life in paradise, permission to view the face of
Allah, the avid attention of seventy-two black-eyed virgins and the
privilege to intervene on behalf of seventy of his relatives on the Day of
Judgment.14 ' Another member of the Institute, Reuven Paz, noted that
these themes appeared in the handwritten letter written by Muhammad
Atta to several of his fellow hijackers. 1" Atta wrote that "'paradise has
been decorated for you with the best of its decorations and ornaments and
the most beautiful women are calling upon you come oh you the
commander with the order of God and they have dressed the best their
attire [sic]."" 45 Atta reminded the other terrorists that this was a festive
occasion since "'the time between you and your marriage is only a few
moments"' and that God will reward you by insuring that your future is
spent "'with the most beautiful women in paradise.,' 146 Atta writes that it
is time to "clean" and to "purify" your heart and to "forget completely a
thing which is called worldly-life for the time for playing has past and the
true promise has come, how much did we waste from our years of time
shouldn't we utilize these hours to offer obedience and closeness.' 47
Who are these suicide bombers? Israeli psychologist Aerial Merari, in
the early 1980's, studied thirty-six Lebanese suicide bombers and
concluded that culture and religion were less important than personality.
14 8
Merari concluded that terrorist ideology offered an "excuse" for these
young men who were inclined to commit suicide and served to legitimize
their self-destructive act.9 He argued that a charismatic political or
religious leader, at most, played a secondary role in influencing individuals
to undertake suicidal bombings.5
Boaz Ganor summarized the research on Hamas suicide bombers and
stated that the basic profile was a young, unmarried and unemployed male
from an impoverished family. 5' They typically were high school educated,
dedicated and disciplined Muslims and expressed a desire to revenge the
143. Id.
144. See Reuven Paz, Programmed Terrorist; An Analysis of the Letter Left Behind by the




147. Id. (translation of hijackers' letter).
148. Merari, supra note 8, at 206.
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injury or death of a close friend or relative."' Ganor argued that the
decision to undertake a suicide bombing was not purely a product of an
individual's personality. Bombers were selected by religious teachers
and others who were well-acquainted with their background.'54 Ganor
found that these putative suicide bombers then underwent a lengthy
process of training and even were placed in graves for several hours in
order to adjust to the acceptance of death.1 5 ' As the day of doom
approached, the shaheed executed a will in which he admonished his
family not to mourn since he was destined for life with Allah. 5' A
videocassette also was recorded for purposes of propaganda. 15 7 Walter
Laqueur, a leading terrorism expert, noted that suicide bombing
particularly appealed to individuals with absolute confidence and certainty
in their cause and a rigid value structure who lacked critical judgment.58
Palestinian therapist Dr. Eyad Sarraj contested that suicide bombing
could not be understood without appreciating the plight of Palestinians. 9
He described the plight of Palestinians who were forced to work in jobs
that Israelis rejected, leaving home early in the morning in order to run a
gauntlet of surveillance and checkpoints and returning home only to rise
early once again in the next morning. In short, Sarraj described the
Palestinians as the "slaves of our enemy" who were "building their homes
on our villages" while "we clean their streets.",161 They were subjected to
the humiliation of being forced to watch in silence the "torture of your
friends and the humiliation of your father."'62 Dr. Sarraj queried, "[n]ow
do you understand why we have turned into suicide killers?''
163
Nasra Hassan spent three years interviewing Palestinian militants and
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deprived and disenfranchised.'6 She found that they ranged from eighteen
to thirty-eight and generally were educated, economically stable and
rational and normal.161 Most were deeply religious and well-versed in the
Koran. 6' Hassan confirmed that the bombers were subjected to lengthy
periods of preparation and ideological indoctrination and reinforcement
from other trainees and their instructors.167  As the day of doom
approached, the members of these secret "martyrdom cells" were feted as
"living martyrs" and recorded and viewed their last testaments.' The
bombers followed an established pattern of rituals as they embarked on
their missions.9 The instructor intoned, "[m]ay Allah be with you, may
Allah give you success so that you achieve Paradise."'"7 The future martyr
then replied that "we will meet in Paradise."' 7 ' As the martyr detonated
his bomb, he intoned "Allah is great.' All praise to Him."' 73 His sacrifice
later was praised in sermons, calendars, leaflets, posters, music, graffiti and
was celebrated by the family and sponsoring organization.74
Events, however, soon outpaced Hassan's analysis as diverse and
seemingly politically unsophisticated individuals were drawn to
martyrdom. The culture of martyrdom now was attracting males as
young as fourteen and fifteen as well as young people from relatively
176
comfortable families, including a growing number of aspiring suicide
bombers from the streets of Egypt. 7 Eighteen-year-old Zaydan Zaydan,
who unsuccessfully attempted to ignite a bomb, described his lack of
education, series of modest low-end jobs and the depressed lifestyle he
164. Nasra Hassan, Letter From Gaza; An Arsenal Of Believers, THE NEW YORKER, Nov.
19, 2001, at 36.
165. Id. at 38.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 41.
169. Id.





175. See Todd S. Purdum, What Do You Mean 'Terrorist?,' N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2002, at
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Apr. 5, 2002, at A23.
177. See Tim Golden, Young Egyptians Hearing Call of 'Martyrdom,' N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
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lived before turning to religion.'78 Following the Israeli incursion into the
Jenin refugee camp, in March 2002, Zaydan volunteered as a martyr and
the next day was equipped with a thirty pound bomb and was issued brief
instructions on igniting the munitions and almost immediately was sent
into Israel. 7 ' Daoud Abu Sway, a forty-six-year-old father of eight in
Bethlehem, defied the image of the suicide bomber.' 80 He prematurely
ignited the explosives strapped to his body while crossing a street in
Jerusalem proximate to a luxury hotel.' Daoud was driven to despair
over the year long unemployment he had experienced as a result of the
difficulty in circumnavigating Israeli checkpoints.8 2 He often talked of
dying as a martyr and left the house one morning and never returned."'
In February 2000, twenty-eight year-old Wafa Idris was identified as
the first female suicide bomber to strike within Israel.1 8 A divorced
volunteer medic with the Palestinian Red Crescent Society, she appeared
to have been angered by the suffering of civilians.8 Darin Abu Eisheh
ignited a bomb in March 2002 and left a note proclaiming that she was
following the example of Wafa Idris."' Darin had earned a certificate with
academic distinction in English language and literature and videotaped a
message which was released following her death stating that every
Palestinian woman "will give birth to an army of suicide attackers, even if
he [the Israelis] tried to kill them, while still in their mother's wombs,
shooting them at the checkpoints of death."'87 Her brother reflected that
"when you lose hope... you are not worried about your life." ' On April
5, 2002, Ayat al-Akhras, eighteen, ignited a bomb in a Jerusalem
supermarket.' 89 She had been raised in the Dheisheh refugee camp outside
178. See James Bennet, In Israeli Bed, Tells of 'Love of Martyrdom,' N.Y. TIMES, June 8,
2002, at Al.
179. Id. at A8.
180. Joel Greenberg, The Suicide Bomber; A Family Is Left 'Sad and Happy' by a Violent




184. James Bennet, Arab Press Glorifies Bomber as Heroine, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2002,
at A8.
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of Bethlehem and was to study journalism and marry.) Ayat al-Akhras
adhered to a routine of study and housework and, according to her family,
was seemingly unaffected by the Israeli incursions."' As of June, 2002, a
total of eight female suicide bombers, including the mother of a three-
year-old, had engaged in suicide bombing' 92
Analysts noted that suicide bombing increasingly was being carried
out by secular groups.' 93 Dr. Iyad Sarraj observed that a new culture of
death and despair was being created in which young people were
compensating for the powerlessness and humiliation of their parents by
engaging in suicide bombing.9 4 This technique also conveyed the despair
and desperation of the Palestinian population.'95 The West Bank resistance
was fragmenting into small autonomous cells with distinct leaders and
ideologies. 96 As terrorists and cells were eliminated, they were replaced
by even more virulently violent groups."' Dr. Nizar Rayan, a Hamas
leader in the Gaza Strip explained that the aim "'is to show the world that
we no longer love this life without our land."" 9 Salah Othman, a famed
Hamas fighter, explained that underlying suicide bombing was the
realization that this life was not worth the "'wing of a mosquito"' and
could not be compared to the "'afterlife;' it is a mere "'drop in the
ocean."'1
99
In June 2002, Israeli forces discovered a photograph of a toddler
wearing a belt studded with what resembled explosives in the family album
of a senior Hamas militant.: The child was dressed in the military fatigues
and red bandanna favored by Hamas fighters 9'O Israeli papers printed the
photograph under banner headlines such as "'Terror in Diapers"' and
190. Id. at A10. Ayat al-Akrhras' bomb killed a seventeen year-old Israeli, Rachel Levy.
President Bush stated that this evidenced that "the future itself is dying, the future of the
Palestinian people and the future of the Israeli people." Id. at Al.
191. Id at A10.
192. Bennet, supra note 117. This article centers on a twenty-year-old female suicide
bomber, Arien Ahmed. Id.
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"'Born to Kill.' 20 2  Ghassan Khatib, the Palestinian labor minister,
retorted that in the event that Israel intended the photo to convey that
Palestinians were teaching their children to hate and to attack Israel that
"'I just want to say that is correct.'"2 3 The next day the United States
announced that the Al Aksa Martyrs Brigades would be classified as a
terrorist organization. °4 A spokesperson for the Al Aksa Brigade warned
that there were a myriad of young people eager to serve as martyrs and
that it was an "honor" to be singled out by the United States, "'the greatest
sponsor of terrorism in the world."'"2
In reaction to the spread of suicide bombings, moderate Palestinian
politicians began indirectly to question this tactic by raising questions
concerning the practicality of the practice."' Fifty-five Palestinian
intellectuals, including prominent Ramallah legislator Hanan Ashrawi,
published an appeal on June 19, 2002 in the Arab-language newspaper Al
Quds calling for a reassessment of military operations targeting civilians in
207Israel, conspicuously omitting the West Bank or Gaza. The statement
urged political groups "'to stop pushing our youth to carry out these
operations.""'20 The appeal did not directly condemn or explicitly refer to
suicide bombing, but argued that the attacks were not "'producing any
results except confirming the hatred, malice and loathing between the two
peoples"' and endangering "'the possibility that the two peoples will live
side by side in peace in two neighboring states."'2 9 Hanan Ashrawai later
clarified that her opposition to suicide bombings in Israeli was based on
political practicality rather than morality since armed attacks on the
Israelis undoubtedly were ethically justified so long as they engaged in
reprehensible practices such as imposition of curfews on the West Bank.210
The day the advertisement appeared, a suicide bomber killed six at a
Jerusalem bus stop.2 This was followed by the publication of a statement
with 150 signatures advocating total and unremitting resistance through
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Joel Brinkley, Palestinian Group Says It Will Increase Bombings, N.Y. TiMEs, Mar.
23, 2002, at A6.
205. Id.





210. Id. at A6.
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armed force to Israel which vilified those Palestinians whom they alleged
had declared war on the Palestinian resistance. Polls indicated that the
original statement limiting suicide bombing to Gaza and the West Bank
was supported by ninety percent of Palestinians while support was
declining for attacks within Israel.
13
As of April 19, 2002, the Israeli government listed 319 people who had
been killed in terrorist attacks over the past eight months.114 The state
social security agency was providing benefits to over 2,000 direct relatives
of the deceased.21 One mother whose twenty-year old son had been killed
in a suicide bomb attack described her unending grief and the deep scar
left by the killing of her child: 'My joy in life has died. I am only a body




Families also suffer from post-traumatic stress and have difficulty eating,
sleeping, leaving home and fear for their other children.2 The State of
Israel honors the victims of suicide attacks as having died in service to the
country.1 8 However, this provides little consolation to the families which
continue to view the deaths of their loved ones as senseless, live in dread of
another assault and possess little optimism for the future."'
Many more have been wounded than have died.22 These victims have
lost hands, legs, portions of their heads and have suffered paralysis from
212. Bennet, supra note 206, at A8. President George W. Bush rejected the claim that
suicide bombers were martyrs and labeled them as "murderers." Id.
213, Id. Various factions, on several occasions, pledged to limit bombings to Gaza and the
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TIMES, Apr. 23, 2002, at A13. In December 2001, Yasir Arafat called for a halt of suicide
bombing and suicide attacks on Israel. Clyde Haberman, Arafat Demands Halt In Attacks
Against Israelis, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2001, at Al. This, like eight previous ceasefire
initiatives, proved to have limited impact. See James Bennett, Arafat Halts Crackdown;
Israel Breaks Links to Him, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2001, at A18. Hamas and Islamic Jihad
refused to agree to end suicide bombing in Israel. John Kifner, Militants Reject Policy on
Attacks in Israel, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, at A10.
214. Joel Brinkley, Israelis Mourn Their Dead In Long Search for Solace, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 19, 2002, at Al. See infra note 220 (for more recent estimates of the number killed).
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218. Id.
219. Id. at 214.
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July 8, 2002, at A6. More than 4,000 Israelis have been injured since the conflict was
renewed in September 2000, almost ten times the estimate of 550 who have been killed.
Roughly 1,450 Palestinians have been killed and 35,700 wounded. There is a debate
concerning relative suffering. The Palestinians contend that they are being killed and
wounded in greater numbers while engaged in the laudable task of resisting occupation; the
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the shrapnel and nails lodged in their brains. 2' The injuries have been
exacerbated by blast trauma caused by waves from the explosion which
reverberate violently through the human body collapsing lungs, breaking
222
small bones and destroying internal organs. Blunt trauma and
penetrating trauma also can result in those instances in which victims are
thrown against a hard object and when a foreign object enters the human
body."' Suicide bombs often are mixed with rat poison, an anticoagulant,
214
which causes victims to bleed to death. These injuries are accentuated
by the mental trauma resulting from the fact that the victims' sense of
security in the safety of everyday affairs is shaken and by the fact that theyS 225
often harbor guilt over having survived. The rehabilitation process
demands support and strength from family and friends and requires
226
enormous medical resources. One neurologist was pleased that an
educated young man who had been wounded in the brain and had suffered
permanent mental damage was now able to work at a fast food chain.2
The result is a region in which Jews as well as Arabs constantly feel at
228
risk and vulnerable. One bus driver commented to the New York Times
that an attack could occur at any time or place, whether in a supermarket
229
or a restaurant or when walking down the street. He noted that there
was a danger in all jobs and that he would not spend his life fleeing for
230
apparent safety.
The Israelis have joined the Palestinians in a cycle of revenge which
has led Israel to resort to various understandable, but questionable
tactics .2 1 The Israelis have targeted the organizations that support suicide
Israelis respond that more of their victims are non-combatants, particularly women and
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232 • 233bombers232 and have engaged in selective assassinations and the arrest of
leaders and militants,234  the destruction of bomb factories and
235 236 237infrastructures of terror, curfews, travel restrictions, deportation of
238 239activists,"' seizures of land on the West Bank, placing pressure on the24- 241
Palestinian leadership to halt the bombings,'4° and searching and
242destroying the homes of the families of suicide bombers. The Israelis
also have attempted to impede suicide bombers by building a fenceT •243
between the West Bank and Israel. At times, this has led to accusations
that the Israelis, themselves, have committed crimes against humanity and
war crimes." In July 2002, an Israeli F-16 fighter jet dropped a one-ton
laser-guided bomb into the civilian area of Al Daraj in the Gaza Strip,
killing a major Hamas military leader, Sheik Salah Shehada, as well as
fourteen other people residing in the house, including nine children.2 The
232. James Bennet, Israelis Clamp Down on Nablus, Hunting Suspects, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
3, 2002, at Al.
233. James Bennet, Israeli Missiles Injure Target And Kill Boys In West Bank, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 11, 2001, at A18. Polls indicated that seventy-four percent of Israelis supported
the assassination policy, but only twenty-two percent believed it decreased terrorism. Forty-
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connection at all to terrorism. Id.
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237. James Bennet, Israeli Military Advances Into More of the West Bank; Plans a
'Crushing' Response, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2002, at A10.
238. John Kifner, Israel Demurs on Deporting Bomb Suspects' Relatives, N.Y. TIMES, July
22, 2002, at A3.
239. John Kifner, Jerusalem Blast Kills Six Israeli; Army Raids Start, N.Y. TIMES, June 20,
2002, at Al, A12.
240. Tim Golden, Militant's Claim: Arafat Can't End Attacks, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2002, at
A16.
241. John Kifner, The Siege: Residents Cower in Vibrant Ramallah, Now a Ghost Town
Occupied by Israelis, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2002, at A8.
242. John Kifner, Israeli Court Upholds Blowing Up Houses, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2002, at
A6.
243. Todd S. Purdum, U.S. Criticizes Israel's New Electronic Fence Along West Bank,
N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2002, at A6.
244. James Bennet, U.N. Report Rejects Claims of a Massacre of Refugees, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 2, 2002, at A10.
245. John Kifner, Gaza Mourns Bombing Victims; Israel Hastens to Explain, N.Y. TIMES,
July 24, 2002, at A6.
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bomb leveled an area equivalent to one-half of a city block.246  Sheik
Sheheda was alleged to have been responsible for coordinating attacks
against hundreds of civilians as well as assaults against the Israeli
241
military.
The international community generally has viewed the conduct of the
Palestinians and Israelis as morally equivalent and to accept terrorism as a
.. 248
product of poverty and social depravation. This is consistent with, what
until recently, has been the reluctance of the international community to
regulate and to repress terrorism.
1II. EARLY EFFORTS To PREVENT AND To PUNISH TERRORISM
The International Association of Penal Law sponsored a series of
International Conferences for the Unification of Penal Law, between 1926
and 1935, attended by public officials and members of private
organizations which, as part of the agenda, addressed the terrorist threat.249
At the Sixth International Conference, in Copenhagen, the Conference
adopted a draft text on terrorism which required States to punish as
"special" offenses certain specified activities including acts directed against
a Head of State or his or her spouse or members of constitutional,
legislative or judiciary bodies in those instances in which the criminal
conduct "endangered the community or created a state of terror calculated
to cause a change in or impediment to the operation of the public
authorities or to disturb international relations.""2 ' These, and other
246. Id.
247. Id. The competing claims of Israel and the Palestinians were raised in the criminal
prosecution of Marwan Barghouti, who was charged with responsibility for the attacks
carried out by the Aksa Martyrs Brigades. Marwan Barghouti, in turn, in his courtroom
statements accused Israeli of being a terrorist State. See Serge Schmemann, Bitter Circus
Erupts as Israel Indicts a Top Fatah Figure, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2002, at A3.
248. Press Release, Kofi Annan, Palestinian Authority Must 'De-Legitimate Terrorism';
Israel Must Stop Settlement Activity In Palestinian Territory (July 17, 2002), available at
http://www.un.orgfNews [Press/does/2002/sgsm8306.doc.htm.
249. Measures to Prevent International Terrorism Which Endangers or Takes Innocent
Human Lives or Jeopardizes Fundamental Freedoms, and Study of the Underlying Causes
of Those Forms of Terrorism and Acts of Violence Which Lie in Misery, Frustration,
Grievance, and Despair and Which Cause Some People to Sacrifice Human Lives,
Including Their Own, In An Attempts to Effect Radical Changes, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/418,
paras. 22-23 (1972) [hereinafter SECRETARY GENERAL 19721, compiled in I
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: A COMPILATION OF U.N. DOCUMENTS (1972-2001) 93 (M.
Cherif Bassiouni et al. eds., 2002).
250. Sixth International Conferences for the Unification of Penal Law Copenhagen (Aug.
31 - Sept. 3, 1935), Actes de la Conf6rence, art. 1, compiled in I INTERNATIONAL
TERRORISM: A COMPILATION OF U.N. DOCUMENTS, supra note 249, at 100 [hereinafter
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enumerated acts,"1 were to be incorporated into a section of domestic
penal codes entitled, "[o]utrages endangering the community or creating a
state of terror." 252
The Sixth Conference also expressed the view that an act which
endangered the community or created a state of terror shall not be
considered a political offense which was immune from extradition. 23 An
individual who was not extradited was to be tried by the custodial State or
254
referred to an international criminal court. The International
Conference's deliberations resulted in the revision of some extradition
treaties which were modified to preclude certain terrorist acts from the
category of non-extraditable political offenses.9 The removal of these
offenses from the category of political crime was intended to remove safe
havens for international criminals and to insure that accused terrorists
would be brought before the relevant domestic or international court.
56
The assassination at Marseilles of King Alexander I of Yugoslavia and
Mr. Louis Barthou, Foreign Minister of the French Republic, on October
9, 1934, led the League of Nations to draft a convention on the repression
of terrorism."' This culminated in the Convention of 1937 for the
Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism.] Article One of the instrument
Conference for Unification of Penal Law]. These attacks are required to be calculated to
cause a change in or impediment to the operation of the public authorities or to disturb
international relations. Id.
251. Id. This lengthy list of acts included causing a disaster by impeding public transport
or interrupting public services and utilities, causing pollution, poisoning drinking water or
food, propagating contagious or epidemic diseases, or any other willful act calculated to
endanger human lives, willful destruction of or damage to public buildings or public
supplies, means of transport and apparatus utilized for fire and rescue operations, damage
to public services or utilities, use of explosives in a public place, or any other willful act
which endangers human lives and the community. Id. art. 2. The Draft Convention also
punished inchoate acts, including incitement, conspiracy and possession or distribution of
materials destined for a terrorist act and knowing assistance of terrorist acts. Id. arts. 3-7.
252. Id. pmbl.
253. Id. VOEU. The rationale was that these acts were particularly dangerous to
mankind and were likely to jeopardize international relations and, as a result, that
offenders not be immune from extradition. Id. The Sixth International Conference
adopted a text on political offenses which, excluded from the category of political offenses,
crimes which "endanger the community or create a state of terror." Id.
254. Id.
255. Id. para. 27. See Thomas M. Franck & Bert B. Lockwood, Jr., Preliminary Thoughts
Towards an International Convention on Terrorism, 68 AM. J. INT'L. L. 69 (1974).
256. See supra notes 254-57 and accompanying text.
257. Id.
258. Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, 19 L.N.T.S. 23 (1938),
compiled in II INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: MULTILATERAL CONVENTIONS 71 (M. Cherif
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defined terrorism as "criminal acts directed against a State and intended or
calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons, or a
group of persons or the general public." 29 The Convention required States
to declare as criminal, acts committed on their territory directed against
another High Contracting Party causing death or grievous bodily harm or
loss of liberty to Heads of States or associated individuals.26°  The
Convention also prohibited the willful destruction of, or damage to, public
property or property devoted to a public purpose belonging to, or under
the authority of, another High Contracting Party.261 Lastly, the Convention
condemned any willful act calculated to endanger the lives of members of
162 26"the public. These offenses were to be extraditable crimes and a State
that declined extradition, under certain circumstances, was obligated to
prosecute and to punish such offenses. The Convention was only ratified
by India and failed to enter into force.26' The Convention significantly
Bassiouni et al. eds., 2001) [hereinafter Convention For The Prevention And Punishment
Of Terrorism]. This was accompanied by a Convention for The Creation Of An
International Criminal Court (Annex).
259. Id. art. 1, para. 2.
260. Id. art. 2. Those protected include: Heads of States, persons exercising the
prerogatives of the head of the State, their hereditary or designated successors, the spouses
of Heads of States, persons charged with public functions or holding public positions when
the act is directed against them in their public capacity. Id. art. 2.
261. Id. art. 2, para. 2.
262. Id. art. 2, para. 3. The Convention punishes an attempt to commit an act prohibited
under the Convention as well the manufacture, obtaining possession, or supplying of arms,
ammunition, explosives or harmful substances with a view to the commission in any country
whatsoever of an offense falling within Article Two. Id. art. 2, paras. 4-5. States also are to
punish various acts committed within their own territory related to an act of terrorism
falling within Article Two and directed against another High Contracting Party, whatever
the country in which the act of terrorism is to be carried out. Id. This includes conspiracy,
incitement, willful participation and assistance. Id. art. 3. The Convention also requires the
regulation of certain firearms and the punishment of the modification of various acts
involving the falsification or forgery of passports or other immigration documents. Id. arts.
13-14.
263. Id. art. 8.
264. Convention For The Prevention And Punishment Of Terrorism, supra note 249, arts.
9-10. A State which does not extradite its nationals shall prosecute and punish such
offenders for acts committed on the territory of another State. Id. A State which declines
to grant extradition of foreigners on their territory shall prosecute such individuals in those
instances in which the country's laws recognize the jurisdiction of its courts over such
offenses committed abroad by foreigners; and the foreigner is a national of a country which
recognizes the jurisdiction of its own courts in respect of offenses committed abroad by
foreigners. Id.
265. Franck & Lockwood, supra note 255, at 70. Other States signed the instrument:
Albania, Argentina, Belgium, India, Bulgaria, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Ecuador,
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limited terrorism to acts meeting the intent requirement of Article One
which were committed on a State's territory against another High
Contracting Party.266 The main focus was on attacks against Heads of State
and public officials. 67 This transnational component, rather than the
intent of the offender or impact of the act, would prove to be the
touchstone of future international efforts.
26
The Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of
Mankind, prepared by the International Law Commission in 1954, was
indicative of a trend stressing the sanctioning of State-sponsored
transnational terrorism.9 The Secretariat submitted a memorandum which
prohibited the undertaking or encouragement by State authorities of
terrorist activities against other regimes or the toleration of organized
activities calculated to carry out terrorist activities in another State.76 TheS271
General Assembly failed to accept the draft code. A subsequent version,
in 1991, provided criminal punishment for individuals organizing, assisting,
financing, encouraging or tolerating acts against another State directed at
persons or property of such a nature as to create a state of terror in the1 i 72
minds of public figures, groups of person or the general public.
The trend towards condemnation of state-supported terrorism was
evident in the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-Operation Among States.27 ' The
Spain, Estonia, France, Greece, Haiti, Monaco, Norway, Netherlands, Peru, Romania,
Czechoslovakia, Turkey, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Venezuela and Yugoslavia.
Id. at 70.
266. See supra note 254 and accompanying text.
267. See id.
268. Convention For The Prevention And Punishment Of Terrorism, supra note 258,
pmbl. "The High Contracting Parties, reaffirming the principle of international law in virtue
of which it is the duty of every State to refrain from any act designed to encourage terrorist
activities directed against another State and to prevent the acts in which such activities take
shape. undertake... to collaborate for this purpose." Id.
269. United Nations International Law Commission, Draft Code of Offenses Against the
Peace and Security of Mankind (1954), 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 112 (1954) (English
translation, available at http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/offfra.htm (last visited Jan. 24,
2003)).
270. SECRETARY GENERAL 1972, supra note 249, para. 35.
271. Id. para. 36.
272. See United Nations International Law Commission, Draft Code of Offenses Against
the Peace and Security of Mankind, G.A. Res. 45/158, U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/46/405
(1991).
273. See Declaration On Principles Of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations
And Co-Operation Among States In Accordance With The Charter Of The United Nations,
G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971).
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second principle clarified that a State shall not organize, assist, foment,
finance, incite or tolerate "subversive, terrorist, or armed activities
directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another State, or
interfere in civil strife in another State. 274
The international community, however, failed to agree to formulate a
general convention on terrorism and was content to address specific
aspects of the issue, the most pressing of which was threats to air safety.275
The International Civil Aviation Organization took the initiative in
formulating three documents, the first was the Tokyo Convention on
Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft which
provided criminals sanctions to acts, whether or not presently in
contravention of a State's penal law, committed by persons on board an
aircraft which jeopardized the safety of a plane in flight, persons or
276property therein, or which jeopardized order and discipline. The
Convention applied in those instances in which the aircraft was "in
flight 2 77 and "outside the territory of any State. 2 78 Jurisdiction was vested
in the State of registration of the aircraft279 as well as with any State
exercising criminal jurisdiction in accordance with its national law.2 A
State which was not the State of registration may not interfere with an
aircraft in flight in order to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over an offense
committed on board an aircraft other than under the territorial,281
national 82 or protective principles281 or in those instances in which
jurisdiction was required to ensure State adherence to a multilateral
agreement"84 or in which the offense involved a breach of any rules or
regulations relating to flight or to the maneuver of an aircraft in flight.28'
274. Id.
275. SECRETARY GENERAL 1972, supra note 249, para. 43.
276. Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft,
Sept. 14, 1963, art. 1, 20 U.S.T. 2941, 704 U.N.T.S. 219 [hereinafter Convention on Offenses
on Aircraft].
277. Id. art. 1, para. 3. "An aircraft is considered to be in flight from the moment when
power is applied for the purpose of take-off until the moment when the landing run ends."
id.
278. Id. art. 1, para. 2.
279. Id. art. 3, paras. 1-2.
280. Id. art. 3, para. 3.
281. Id art. 4(b).
282. Convention on Offenses on Aircraft, supra note 276, art. 4(a).
283. Id. art. 4(c).
284. Id. art. 4(d).
285. Id. art. 4(e).
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The Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of
Aircraft, of 1970, marked a major step forward in counter-terrorism and
required Signatory States to punish by severe penalties the unlawful
seizure of an aircraft by a person on board a plane in flight by threat of
286force or by any other form of intimidation. The scope of the instrument
was limited to those instances in which an international element was
involved in the flight. 18 The Convention adopted an expanded
jurisdictional provision which vested jurisdiction in the State of registration
2881
of the aircraft, the State in which the aircraft landed with the offender on
board, 9 the State which was the principle place of business or permanent
residence, where relevant, of the lessee and in a State which has custody
over an offender and which determines not to extradite him to trial.29' In
such instances, States are obliged without exception to submit the case to
292its competent authorities for prosecution. The Convention also does not
293
exclude criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with national law.
The offense shall be considered an extraditable offense in any extradition
treaty between States or in the case of Contracting States which do not
286. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, arts.
1-2, 22 U.S.T. 1641, 860 U.N.T.S. 105 [hereinafter Hague Convention]. An individual who
is an accomplice or who attempts to commit an offense under the Convention also is liable.
Id. art. 1.
287. Id. art. 3(3). The Convention only is applicable in those instances in which the site of
take-off or the site of actual landing of the aircraft on board of which the offense is
committed are situated outside the territory of the State of registration of the aircraft. Id.
It is not controlling whether the aircraft was engaged in an international or in a domestic
flight. Id.
288. Id. art. 4, para. 1(a).
289. Hague Convention, supra note 286, art. 4, para. l(b).
290. Id. art. 4, para. 1(c).
291. Id. art. 4, para. 2.
292. Id. art. 7.
293. See id. art. 4, para. 3. Each Contracting State shall establish jurisdiction when the
offense is committed on board an aircraft registered in the State; when the aircraft lands in
the territory with the alleged offender still on board; when the offense is committed on
board an aircraft leased to a lessee who has his or her principal place of business or
permanent residence in the State. Id. art. 4, para. 1. Each Contracting State shall take such
measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offense in the event that
extradition is not granted. Hague Convention, supra note 286, art. 4, para. 2. The
Contracting State in the territory of which the alleged offender is found shall, if it does not
extradite him, be obliged to submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of
prosecution. Id. art. 7. The offenses enumerated in the Convention are deemed to be
extraditable offenses in any extradition treaty existing between contracting parties. Id. art.
8. Contracting States shall afford one another judicial assistance in connection with
criminal proceedings pertaining to offenses under the Convention. Id. art.10.
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make extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty294 and the
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure also may be
considered a legally sufficient basis for extradition in the absence of a
295treaty. States are to afford one another the greatest measure of
296
assistance in connection with criminal offenses enumerated in the Treaty .
The Montreal Convention for The Suppression of Unlawful Acts
297Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, of 1971, provided that an individual
commits an offense if he or she unlawfully and intentionally committed an
act of violence against a person on board an aircraft in flight which:
endangered the safety of that aircraft;2 9' destroyed or damaged an aircraft
in service so as to render it incapable of flight or safety in flight;2 99 or
destroyed or damaged air navigation facilities or interfered with their
operation so as to endanger the safety of an aircraft in flight." The
Convention also called for criminal penalties against individuals who
communicated false information which endangered the safety of an aircraft
in flight 30' or who placed a device or substance or board an aircraft in
service which was likely to destroy or to damage the plane so as to render
it incapable of flight 0 2 The Convention, with the exception of the
destruction or damage of air navigation facilities, only was applicable in
those instances in which the place of take-off or landing of the aircraft was
situated outside the territory of the State of the aircraft's registration 3 or
294. Id. art. 8, para. 3.
295. Hague Convention, supra note 286, art. 8, para. 2. "The offense, for purposes of
extradition between Contracting Parties, shall be treated as if it has been committed not
only in the place in which it occurred but also in the territories of States required to
establish their jurisdiction" under the terms of the treaty. Hague Convention, supra note
286, art. 8, para. 4.
296. Id. art. 10.
297. Montreal Convention, supra note 29.
298. Id. art. 1, para. 1. An aircraft was considered to be in flight from the moment when
the external doors were closed following embarkation until the moment when any such
door was opened for disembarkation. Id. art. 2(a). The Convention also punishes an
attempt to commit an enumerated offense as well as individuals who served as an
accomplice to an individual who committed or attempted to commit an offense. Id. art. 1,
para 2.
299. Id. art. 1, para. 1(b). An aircraft is considered to be in service from the beginning of
the preflight preparation of the aircraft by ground personnel or by the crew for a specific
flight until twenty-fours after any landing. The period of service shall, in any event, extend
for the entire period in which the aircraft is in flight. Id. art. 2(b).
300. Id. art. 1, para. 1(d).
301. Id. art. 1, para. 1(e).
302. Id. art. 1, para. 1(c).
303. Montreal Convention, supra note 29, art. 4, para. 2(a).
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in which the offense was committed in the territory of a State other than
the State of registration of the aircraft.3° The Convention, notwithstanding
the former provisions, shall also apply to the above provisions in the event
that the alleged offender is located in the territory of a State other than the
State of registration of the aircraft. °5 The provision pertaining to the
destruction or damage of air navigation facilities only shall apply in those
cases in which the navigation facilities are employed in international air
navigation .
The instrument further provided that States shall take measures to
establish jurisdiction over the offenses listed in the Convention in those
instances in which the offense is committed in the territory of the State;30 7
the offense is committed against or on board an aircraft registered in that
State;'0s the aircraft which was the situs of the offense lands with the
offender aboard;' °  and in those instances in which the offense is
committed against or on board an aircraft leased to a lessee who has his or
her principal place of business or permanent residence in the State."" The
Convention does not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in
accordance with national law."' Each High Contracting State also shall
establish jurisdiction in those instances in which an alleged offender is notS -. 312
extradited for trial. A state which fails to extradite an offender is obliged
to submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of
• 313
prosecution. Contracting States also were required to take all practicable
measures for the purpose of preventing offenses under the Convention
314
and were to afford one another the "greatest measure of assistance" in
connection with criminal proceedings brought against offenses enumerated
in the Convention.315
The 1971 Montreal Convention expanded th : scope of existing
counter-terrorism treaties by asserting an international interest in the
304. Id. art. 4, para. 2(a).
305. Id. art. 4, para. 2(b).
306. Id. art. 4, para. 5.
307. Id. art. 5, para. 1(a).
308. ld. art. 5, para. l(b).
309. Montreal Convention, supra note 29, art. 5, para. 1(c).
310. Id. art. 5, para. 1(d).
311. Id. art. 5, para. 3.
312. Id. art. 5, para. 2.
313. See id. art. 7. The extradition provisions provided for in the Hague Convention are
also incorporated into the Montreal Convention. See id. art. 8; see also supra notes 292-93
and accompanying text.
314. Id. art. 10, para. 1.
315. Montreal Convention, supra note 29, art. 11.
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prohibition of violence against aircraft committed by individuals who were
not required to be on board; by modestly loosening the requirement that
the aircraft must be in flight; and by providing for protection for aircraft
undergoing preflight preparation."6 This was supplemented by a 1988
protocol which required Signatory States to assume jurisdiction over a
crime of violence against person and property at an airport serving
international civil aviation.3 7
The protection of aerial commerce and transportation was viewed as
being in the interests of most members of the international community and
commanded a multinational consensus."' The Preamble to the 1971
Montreal Agreement noted that unlawful acts against the safety of civil
aviation jeopardized the safety of persons and property, seriously impeded
the operation of air services and undermined the confidence of the peoples
of the world in the safety of civil aviation. 9 These triad of treaties
advanced the international prevention and punishment of terrorism by
320providing for expansive jurisdictional claims, enhanced extradition
316. See supra note 273 and accompanying texts. An aircraft is considered to be in
service from the beginning of the preflight preparation of the aircraft by ground personnel
or by the crew for a specific flight until twenty-four hours after any landing. The period of
service also shall extend for the entire period during which an aircraft is in flight. Montreal
Convention, supra note 29, art. 2(b). An aircraft is considered to be in flight from the
moment when all the external doors are closed following embarkation until the moment
when any such door is opened for disembarkation. In the case of forced landing, the flight
shall be deemed to continue until the competent authorities take over the responsibility for
the aircraft and for the persons and property on board. Id. art. 2(1). Individuals under the
Hague Convention might be liable as accessories. See supra note 286 and accompanying
text.
317. See Montreal Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports
Serving International Civil Aviation, Supplement, Feb. 23, 1988, 27 L.L.M. 627.
318. Secretary General 1972, supra note 249, paras. 42-67. See Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, Mar. 10, 1988,
art. 3, 27 I.L.M. 668. This Convention prohibits the unlawful and intentional seizure or
assumption of control over a vessel navigating or scheduled to navigate throughout from
waters beyond the outer limit of the territorial sea of a single State. The Treaty also
prohibits violence against person on board a ship which is likely to endanger the safe
navigation of the ship, destruction or damage to a ship or its cargo which is likely to
endanger safe navigation; placing a device or substance on board which is likely to destroy
or cause damage to a ship or its cargo and which is likely to endanger the safe navigation of
the ship; destruction or serious damage to navigational facilities; communication of false
information which endangers the safe navigation of a ship; and injury or death of any
person in the commission of or attempted commission of any of these offenses. Id.
319. Montreal Convention, supra note 29, pmbl.
320. See supra notes 307-12 and accompanying text.
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• • 321provisions and by requiring international cooperation and assistance in
322detecting and prosecuting acts of terror.
Another area of continuing concern was the safety and security of
diplomats who increasingly were the target of kidnapping, hostage-taking
and other physical attacks.12' These attacks led, in 1973, to the Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally
Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents which was intended to
prevent and to punish this threat to the "maintenance of normal
international relations which are necessary for co-operation among
States. 324 The instrument protected Heads of State and other State
officials as well as officials of international organizations who at the time
32"of the crime were entitled to special protections against murder,
326kidnapping or other attack upon their person or liberty. Protection also
was extended against the intentional commission of violent attacks upon
their official residences, private premises or means of transport which were
likely to endanger their persons' liberty.3 " These offenses were to be
punished by "appropriate penalties" which consider "their grave nature.
328
The document contained the familiar provisions for expansive
jurisdictional claims, 29 as well as the standard requirement that States
either extradite or prosecute offenders 33  and stipulated that crimes
enumerated in the Convention shall be incorporated into extradition
treaties existing between States Parties."' States Parties also were to
321. See supra notes 312-14 and accompanying text.
322. See supra notes 314-15 and accompanying text.
323. Convention on the Prevention And Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally
Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 28, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, 1035
U.N.T.S. 167 [hereinafter Diplomatic Convention].
324. Id. pmbl.
325. Id. art. 1, para. 1(b).
326. Id. art. 2, para 1(a).
327. Id. art. 2, para 1(b). Article Two also incorporates a prohibition on threats, and
attempts to commit an enumerated offense, as well participation as an accomplice. Id. art.
2, para. 1.
328. Id. art. 2, para. (2).
329. Diplomatic Convention, supra note 323, art. 3. State Parties shall take such measures
as may be necessary to establish jurisdiction over crimes when the offense is committed in
the territory of that State or on board a ship or aircraft registered in the State; when the
alleged offender is a national of that State; when the crime is committed against an
internationally protected person whose status is based on the functions which he or she
exercises on behalf of that State. Id. art. 3, para. 1(a)-(c).
330. Id. art. 7.
331. ld. art. 8, para. 1. The Diplomatic Convention also provides that the treaty shall be a
sufficient basis for extradition and States Parties which do not make extradition conditional
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cooperate in the prevention 332 and prosecution of offenses under the
Convention.33
In summary, during this initial period of multinational regulation, the
international community was able to coalesce to combat crimes against
interstate aircraft and diplomatic agents.334 However, an agreement could
not be concluded on a comprehensive convention combating the general
scourge of international terrorism.335 Major progress nevertheless was
achieved in creating a legal architecture of processes and procedures to
prevent and to punish terrorism.336
IV. THE MIDDLE PERIOD: THE ANTI-COLONIAL STRUGGLE
AND THE LEGAL REGULATION OF TERRORISM
The prevention and punishment of terrorism was viewed by various
States as conflicting with the promotion of the self-determination of
peoples. 37 The Declaration On the Granting of Independence to Colonial
Countries and Peoples, of 1961, declared that the subordination of
"peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation" constituted a
violation of fundamental human rights and was contrary to the Charter of
the United Nations. 38 The Declaration recognized that all peoples
possessed the right to self-determination and that all armed action or
repressive measures directed against dependent people "shall cease" in
on the existence of a treaty shall recognize the crimes contained in the Convention as
extraditable offenses. Id. art. 8, paras. 2-3.
332. Id. art. 4. States Parties were to take all practicable measures to prevent preparations
in their respective territories for the commission of crimes under the Convention and States
Parties also were to exchange information and to coordinate measures to prevent penal
offenses against protected persons. Id. art. 4(a)-(b).
333. Id. art. 10. The Organization of American States adopted a Convention requiring
punishment of specified crimes of violence against persons to whom the State has the duty
to give special protection according to international law. These acts, as well as extortion in
connection with these crimes, were to be "considered common crimes of international
significance, regardless of motive." Organization of American States, Convention to
Prevent and Punish the Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form of Crime Against Persons and
Related Extortion that are of International Significance, Feb. 2, 1971, 27 U.S.T. 3949, 10
I.L.M. 255.
334. SECRETARY GENERAL 1972, supra note 249, paras. 62-63.
335. See id. para. 65.
336. See supra notes 307-15 and accompanying text.
337. See Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and
Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 66, U.N. Doc.
A/4684 (1960) [hereinafter Colonial Countries And Peoples].
338. Id. para. 1.
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order to permit them to exercise complete independence and integrity
over their national territory.339
The 1977 Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions,
34
0
according to some commentators, provided legal protection to guerillas
and terrorists fighting for causes deemed political palatable by States in the
Third World. 4 ' The first of the Protocols extended the application of the
Geneva Conventions to armed conflicts in which "peoples are fighting
against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist
regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination." Article
Forty-four, recognized that there were situations in which, given the nature
of the hostilities, that combatants could not distinguish themselves from
343the civilian population. In these situations, they retained their status as
combatants provided that they openly carried their arms during a military
engagement and during such time that they were visible to an adversary
while engaged in a military deployment preceding the launching of an
attack.344  This substantially modified the traditional four-prong
requirement for recognition of prisoner of war status articulated in the
Geneva Conventions.345
Protocol 1I extended the recognition accorded to irregular forces by
providing protections during armed conflicts which occurred in the
territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces and
"dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under
339. Id. para. 4.
340. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 10, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3,
4(E), 272(F) [hereinafter Protocol I]; Protocol Additional To The Geneva Conventions Of
August 12, 1949, And Relating To The Protection Of Victims Of Non-International Armed
Conflicts, June 10, 1977,1125 U.N.T.S. 609, 610(E), 650(F) [hereinafter Protocol II].
341. See Abraham D. Sofaer, Agora: The U.S. Decision Not To Ratify Protocol I To The
Geneva Conventions On The Protection Of War Victims (Cont'd), 82 AM. J. INT'L. L. 784
(1988).
342. Protocol I, supra note 340, art. 1, para. 4. The Geneva Conventions of 1949 applied
"to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or
more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of
them." Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 2, 6
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter POW Convention].
343. Protocol 1, supra note 340, art. 44, para. 3.
344. Id. art. 43, para. 3(a)-(b).
345. POW Convention, supra note 342, art. 42, para. 2. This requires that militias or
volunteer corps, including organized resistance movements, are commanded by a person
responsible for his subordinates; having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;
carrying arms openly; and conducting operations in accordance with the laws and customs
of war. Id.
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responsible command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as
to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations
and to implement this Protocol." 346 The General Assembly significantly
also did not include terrorism as an offense encompassed within the
Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War
Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity; the instrument was limited to the
offenses enumerated in the Nuremberg Charter, apartheid and genocide.347
The Protocols to the Geneva Conventions, while maintaining the
348integrity of the distinction between civilians and combatants, took the
unprecedented step of formally recognizing that irregular combatants were
entitled to the status of lawful combatants. -1 9 This constituted a significant
step in legitimizing armed attacks by terrorist organizations.5 Indicative
of this trend was the proposal proffered by Thomas M. Franck and Bert
B. Lockwood Jr. who, in 1974, argued that the prospects for preventing
terrorist violence rested on the commitment of regimes to internal
democracy."' In return, they urged terrorist groups to agree to limit
themselves to attacks on governmental and military officials with the
understanding that captured militants would be treated as prisoners-of-
352
war.
The influence of this movement towards recognizing the legitimacy of
armed groups fighting for self-determination can be seen in the
International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages of 1979.15' The
Convention was adopted in response to the upsurge in Middle Eastern
hostage taking and required States to punish by appropriate penalties
any person who seized or detained and threatened to kill, to injure or
continued to detain another person in order to compel a State,
international organization or individual or group of individuals to perform
346. Protocol II, supra note 340, art. 1, para. 1. The Protocol is not applicable to internal
disturbances and tensions such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts
of a similar nature. Id. art. 1, para. 2.
347. Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and
Crimes Against Humanity, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1968, 754 U.N.T.S. 73, 8 I.L.M. 68.
348. Protocol I, supra note 340, arts. 50-52.
349. See supra notes 340-46 and accompanying text.
350. See Sofaer, supra note 341 and accompanying text.
351. See Franck & Lockwood, supra note 255, at 88-89.
352. See id.
353. International Convention Against The Taking Of Hostages, G.A. Res. 34/146, U.N.
GAOR, Supp. No. 46, at 245, U.N. Doc. A/34/786 (1979) [hereinafter Hostage Convention].
354. Id. pmbl. The preamble recognized that the taking of hostages is an "offense of
grave concern to the international community" and that it is "urgently necessary to develop
international co-operation" between States to prevent, prosecute and punish acts of the
taking of hostages as "manifestations of international terrorism." Id.
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or abstain from doing any act as a condition for the release of the
hostage."' The Convention, however, provided that the treaty shall not
apply to an act of hostage-taking committed during armed conflicts,
including situations in which peoples are fighting against colonial
domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise
of their right of self-determination.356
As late as January 1990, the General Assembly adopted a resolution
which, while condemning terrorism, stressed that the document was
without prejudice to the right of self-determination, freedom and
independence of peoples.357 The resolution provided particular support to
"peoples under colonial and racist regimes or other forms of alien
domination or the right of these peoples under colonial and racist regimes
or other forms of alien domination, or the right of these peoples to struggle
legitimately to this end and to seek and receive support.,
35 8
The lingering influence of this Third World support for anti-colonial
struggles and self-determination can be seen in the Arab Convention on
the Suppression of Terrorism, of 1998, which provided that an act
committed in a "situation of struggle by any means, including the armed
struggle against foreign occupation and aggression for liberation and self-
determination is not to be considered a crime., 3 9 Acts undertaken "in
defense of the soil unity of any Arab state are also not be considered
crimes."'3 60 The Convention of the Organization of the Islamic Conference,
in 2000, adopted similar language in providing that an "armed struggle
against foreign occupation, aggression, colonialism, and hegemony, aimed
at liberation and self-determination ... shall not be considered a terrorist
crime." 36' A similar provision was incorporated into the Organization of
African Unity's Convention on the Prevention and Combating of
Terrorism, of 1999, which provided that "the struggle waged by peoples
... for their liberation or self-determination, including armed struggle
355. Id. art. 1.
356. Id. art. 12. See also Convention on Ihe Safety of United Nations and Associated
Personnel, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., 84th plen. Mtg., at arts. 9-11, U.N. Doc. A/Res./49/59
(1995)
357. See U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., 72nd plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/Res/44/29 (1989).
358. Id. para. 17.
359. The League Of Arab States, The Council of Arab Interior and Justice Ministers
(Apr. 22, 1998), The Arab Convention On The Suppression Of Terrorism, art. 2, compiled in
II INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: MUTLILATERAL CONVENTIONS, supra note 258, at 393.
360. Id.
361. Organization Of The Islamic Conference, Convention Of The Organization Of The
Islamic Conference On Combating International Terrorism, compiled in II INTERNATIONAL
TERRORISM: MUTLILATERAL CONVENTIONS, supra note 258, at 429.
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against colonialism, occupation, aggression and domination by foreign
forces shall not be considered as terrorist acts. ' 62
This middle period of counter-terrorist activity presented the tension
between the condemnation of terrorism and the international endorsement
of the self-determination of peoples, particularly those formerly under
colonial control.36' The combating of European hegemony, for many
States, was the primary pernicious threat.3 4 This movement was gradually
eclipsed by events, but lingered in documents produced by former-colonial
countries in the Middle East and Africa.6
V. THE CONTEMPORARY PERIOD
The growing unrest in North Africa, the Middle East, Central Europe
and Southeast Asia led to unprecedented United Nations initiatives to
366prevent and to punish terrorism. In July, 1990, the United Nations
Secretariat prepared a report on international action against organized
crime and terrorism.36 The report noted the enhanced sophistication of the
organization, tactics and weapons of terrorist organizations demanded
361
multinational action against this growing threat, particularly in light of
the increasing transnational cooperation between terrorists.39 There also
was evidence of coalitions between terrorists and drug traffickers.37 ° The
report noted that existing treaties had introduced a requirement that State
Parties apprehend alleged offenders present in their territory and either
extradite them or submit the case to their own prosecutorial authorities.37" '
This system was limited by the practical impediment of obtaining the
evidence necessary to convict an accused when the alleged offense was
362. Organization Of African Unity, Convention On Prevention And Combating Of
Terrorism (July 14, 1999), art. 3(1), compiled in II INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM:
MUTLILATERAL CONVENTIONS, supra note 258, at 417, 419. The Convention, however,
provides that "political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other motives
shall not be a justifiable defense,." Id. art. 3(2).
363. See supra notes 337-56 and accompanying text.
364. See supra notes 339 and accompanying text.
365. See supra notes 359-62 and accompanying text.
366. See GILES KEPEL, JIHAD THE TRAIL OF POLITICAL ISLAM 205-321 (Anthony F.
Roberts trans., 2002).
367. U.N. Secretariat, Effective National and International Action Against: (A)
Organized Crime; (B) Terrorist Criminal Activities, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.144115 (1990)
[hereinafter U.N. Secretariat].
368. Id. para. 56.
369. Id. para. 74.
370. Id. paras. 82-7.
371. Id. para. 67.
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committed abroad.372  Accordingly, increased cooperation between
countries was required.373 The existing treaties also suffered from the
limited number of States Parties374 and by a lack of resolve to vigorously
enforce their requirements. 7 ' The instruments also failed to encompass the
376intentional targeting of civilian populations by bombs or other weapons
and neglected to address the threat of weapons of mass destruction.377
The United Nations Secretary General issued a report, in October
1991, which articulated the views of the European Community378 and of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 3 9 condemning and calling for a
program of action against terrorism.8 The Sixth Committee responded by
recommending the adoption of a resolution on measures to eliminate
181international terrorism. In January 1992, the United Nations General
Assembly adopted an unprecedented and historic comprehensive
resolution on terrorism, entitled "Measures To Eliminate InternationalT • ,,382
Terrorism. The resolution, in part, urged States to fulfill their
372. Id. para. 68.
373. U.N. Secretariat, supra note 367.
374. id. para. 70.
375. Id. para. 72.
376. Id. para. 70.
377. Id. para. 72. The Secretariat's report proposed a new Model Treaty on Mutual
Assistance in Criminal Matters as well as a new Model Treaty on Extradition. Id. para. 81.
378. Secretary-General, Measures to Prevent International Terrorism Which Endangers
or Takes Innocent Human Lives or Jeopardizes Fundamental Freedoms and Study of the
Underlying Causes of Those Forms of Terrorism: Report of the Secretary-General:
Convening Under the Auspices of the United Nations, of an International Conference to
Define Terrorism and to Differentiate It from the Struggle of Peoples for National
Liberation, U.N. Doe. A/46/346/Add.1 (1991) compiled in I INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM:
MUTLILATERAL CONVENTIONS, supra note 258, at 482.
379. Secretary-General, Measures to Prevent International Terrorism Which Endangers
or Takes Innocent Human Lives or Jeopardizes Fundamental Freedoms and Study of the
Underlying Causes of Those Forms of Terrorism: Report of the Secretary-General:
Convening Under the Auspices of the United Nations, of an International Conference to
Define Terrorism and to Differentiate It from the Struggle of Peoples for National
Liberation (1991), compiled in I INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: MUTLILATERAL
CONVENTIONS, supra note 249, at 487.
380. See supra notes 378-79 and accompanying texts.
381. Report of the Sixth Committee, Measures to Prevent International Terrorism Which
Endangers or Takes Innocent Human Lives or Jeopardizes Fundamental Freedoms and
Study of the Underlying Causes of Those Forms of Terrorism and Acts of Violence Which
Cause Some People to Sacrifice Human Lives, Including Their Own, In Attempt to Effect
Radical Changes, U.N. A/46/654 (1991), compiled in I INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: A
COMPILATION OF U.N. DOCUMENTS, supra note 249, at 482.
382. G.A. Res. 46/51, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/Res./46/51 (1992).
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obligations under international law and to take "effective and resolute
measures" for the "speedy and final elimination" of internationalt • 383
terrorism. The resolution went on to call on States to: prevent the
preparation and organization within their territories of "terrorist and
subversive acts" against other States and their citizens; 3s4 ensure the
apprehension and prosecution or extradition of perpetrators of terrorist
acts;115 conclude special agreements on a bilateral, regional and multilateral
basis;3" exchange relevant information concerning the prevention and
combating of terrorism;3 87 and to promptly take all necessary steps to
implement existing conventions and to harmonize these treaties with
domestic legislation.3  The resolution also requested the Secretary-
General to seek and to report on the views of Member States concerning
the nature, methods and means of international terrorism.389
In 1994, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution
on human rights and terrorism which unequivocally condemned "all acts,
methods and practices of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations." 390
These acts were denounced as destructive of human rights, fundamental
freedoms, democracy and of the economic and social development of
States. 391
The Sixth Committee, in December, 1994, recommended the adoption
of a resolution on the elimination of international terrorism.39 ' The same
session the General Assembly adopted a declaration on measures to
eliminate international terrorism 93 which solemnly declared that Member
States unequivocally condemned terrorism as criminal and unjustifiable
394
and constituted a grave violation of the purposes and principles of the
United Nations.9 Criminal acts intended or calculated to provide a state
383. Id. para. 4.
384. Id. para. 4(a).
385. Id. para. 4(b).
386. Id. para. 4(c).
387. Id. para. 4(d).
388. G.A. Res. 46/51, supra note 382, para. 4(e).
389. Id. paras. 12-14.
390. G.A. Res. 48/122, U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/48/122 (1993).
391. Id. para. 1.
392. Report of the Sixth Committee, Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, U.N.
Doc. A/49/743 (1994), compiled in I INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: A COMPILATION OF U.N.
DOCUMENTS, supra note 249, at 506.
393. G.A. Res. 49/60, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 303, U.N. Doc. A/49/60
(1995).
394. Id. para. 1.
395. Id para. 2.
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of terror for political purposes were unjustifiable, whatever considerations
of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any
other nature which may be invoked to justify them. States were to
refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in terrorist
397
acts in the territories of other States and were to take effective measures
to combat international terrorism. 98 The resolution reaffirmed the
measures to combat international terrorism set forth in the previous
measure on combating international terrorism,399 adding a requirement
that States ensure that individuals who received asylum have not engaged
in terrorist activity. 4°° States were to exchange information concerning theS 401
prevention and combating of terrorism and the effective implementation
of conventions and to conclude mutual judicial assistance and extradition
agreements 0 2  States also were urged to review the adequacy of
international agreements and to ratify existing conventions. 3
The General Assembly, in 1996, reaffirmed the resolution 49/60 of
December 1994 and called on the Secretary-General to submit an annual
report on the implementation of Paragraph Ten of the Declaration on
Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism.40 This paragraph
requested the Secretary-General to assist in implementing the Declaration
by reviewing the status and implementation of existing multilateral,
regional and bilateral agreements; 4 5 collecting data on the incidence of
terrorist incidents, national laws and prosecutions; reviewing the
adequacy of existing international instruments; and assisting States in
organizing workshops and training courses on combating crimes connected
with international terrorism.
396. Id. para. 3.
397. Id. para. 4.
398. Id. para. 5.
399. G.A. Res. 49/60, supra note 393, para. 5(a)-(f). See supra notes 382-89 and
accompanying text.
400. G.A. Res. 49/60, supra note 393, para. 5(f).
401. Id. para. 6.
402. Id. para. 7.
403. Id. para. 8.
404. G.A. Res. 50/52, U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/Res./50/53 (1996).
405. G.A. Res. 49/60, supra note 393, para. 10(a).
406. Id. para. 10(a)-(b).
407. Id. para. 10(c).
408. Id. para. 10(d).
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The General Assembly also adopted another in a continuing series of
resolutions on Human Rights and Terrorism,4 9 which expressed solidarityS • 410
with the victims of terrorism, condemned the destruction of human
rights, fundamental freedoms and democracy resulting from terrorist acts
4
1
while, at the same time, calling upon States to take all necessary and
effective measures in accordance with international standards of human
rights to prevent, combat and to eliminate acts of terrorism.1 The
General Assembly further urged relevant United Nations bodies to pay
appropriate attention to terrorism, requested the Secretary-General to
continue to explore the establishment of a United Nations voluntary fund
414for victims of terrorism and called on the Secretary-General to transmit
the resolution to Member States for comment.4"5 This was a significant
recognition that terrorism contravened the human rights of peoples and
that State retaliation for such acts also might jeopardize fundamental
freedoms. 6
In accordance with the recommendation of the Sixth Committee,
417
the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 51/201, in 1996,
which reaffirmed the organization's condemnation of terrorism.418
Annexed to the Convention was a supplement to the 1994 Declaration on
• 419
Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism. The resolution
established an Ad Hoc Committee to prepare draft conventions on the
suppression of terrorist bombing and on nuclear terrorism as a step
towards the development of a comprehensive legal framework on
international terrorism. 420 The committee was to report to the General
Assembly.4 2' The supplemental instrument affirmed the General
409. G.A. Res. 50/186, U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., 99th plen. mtg., U.N. Doe. AIRes/50/186
(1996).
410. Id. para. 1.
411. Id. para. 2.
412. Id. para. 3.
413. Id. para. 8.
414. Id. para. 6.
415. G.A. Res. 50/186, supra note 409, para. 7.
416. See supra notes 410-11 and accompanying text.
417. Report of the Sixth Committee, Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, U.N.
Doc. A/51/631 (1996), compiled in I INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: A COMPILATION OF U.N.
DOCUMENTS, supra note 249, at 531.
418. G.A.Res. 210, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., U.N. Doc.A/RES/51/210 (1997).
419. Id. Annex.
420. Id. para. 9
421. Id. para. 12.
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422Assembly's condemnation of terrorism as contrary to the purposes and
principles of the United Nations, stressed the desirability of insuring that••424
political asylum was not extended to terrorists and urged States to insure
that terrorists and those involved in the financing, planning or incitement
of terrorism were expeditiously extradited or subjected to trial.425 Member
States were urged to share expertise and information regarding the
426
activities of terrorist groups.
The newly-formed Ad Hoc Committee, in 1997, was presented with
and endorsed draft resolutions on the suppression of acts of nuclear
terrorism sponsored by the Russian Federation42 ' along with a proposed
instrument on the prohibition of terrorist bombing proposed by the major
428industrialized countries and the Russian Federation.
The proposed International Convention for the Suppression of
Terrorist Bombing was endorsed by the Sixth Committee 429 and adopted
by the United Nations, as the Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist
430Bombings. Article Two provided that an individual committed an
offense within the confines of the Convention by unlawfully and
422. Id. Annex, para 1.
423. Id. Annex, para. 2.
424. G.A. Res. 210, supra note 418, Annex, paras. 3-4.
425. Id. Annex, paras. 5-7.
426. Id. Annex, para. 8.
427. See Ad Hoc Committee Established by General Assembly Resolution 51/210 of 17
December 1996, Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, Drafts
Submitted by the Russian Federation, U.N. Doc. A/AC.252/L.3 (1998), compiled in
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: A COMPILATION OF U.N. DOCUMENTS, supra note 249, at
550.
428. See Ad Hoc Committee Established by General Assembly Resolution 51/210 of 17
December 1996, Preliminary Working Document Submitted by France on Behalf of the
Group of Seven Major Industrialized Countries and the Russian Federation, U.N. Doc.
A/AC.252/L.2 (1997), compiled in I INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: A COMPILATION OF U.N.
DOCUMENTS, supra note 249, at 558. See Ad Hoc Committee Established by General
Assembly Resolution 51/210 of 17 December 1966, U.N. Doc. A/52/37 (1997), compiled in
I INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: A COMPILATION OF U.N. DOCUMENTS, supra note 249, at
565.
429. Report of the Sixth Committee, Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, U.N.
Doc. A/52/653 (1997), compiled in I INTERNATIONALTERRORISM: A COMPILATION OF U.N.
DOCUMENTS, supra note 249, at 645.
430. Convention For The Suppression Of Terrorist Bombings, U.N. Doc. A/Res/52/164
(1998), compiled in 11 INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: MULTILATERAL CONVENTIONS. supra
note 258, at 183 [hereinafter Terrorist Bombings]. See also International Civil Aviation
Organization: Final Act of the International Conference On Air Law and Convention on
the Marking of Plastic Explosive for the Purpose Of Detection, U.N. Doc. S/22393/Corr.1,
30 I.L.M. 721 (1991).
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intentionally delivering, placing, discharging or detonating an explosive or
other lethal device "into or against a place of public use, a State or
government facility, a public transportation system or an infrastructure
facility. '431 This offense required an intent to cause death or serious bodily
* 432injury or an intent to cause extensive destruction where such destruction
resulted in or was likely to result in a major economic loss.433 In addition
to the perpetrator, liability was extended to individuals who served as414 435
accomplices, organizers or directed others to commit an offense435 or in
any other fashion intentionally contributed to the commission of an
436
offense punishable by the Convention. The Convention was inapplicable
in those instances in which the offense was committed within a single State,
the alleged offender and the victims were nationals of that State, the
putative offender was found in the territory of that State and no other
State could claim a basis to exercise jurisdiction under the Convention.
States Parties with custody over an offender, in the event that they did not
extradite the offender, were obliged "to submit the case without undue
delay to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution.,
438
Offenses punishable under the Convention were to be punishable by
"appropriate penalties which take into account the grave nature of those
offenses. 439  States Parties were to afford one another the "greatest
431. Terrorist Bombings, supra note 430, art. 2.
432. Id. art. 2, para. 1(a).
433. Id. art. 2, para. 1(b).
434. Id. art. 2, para. 3(a).
435. Id. art. 2, para. 3(b)
436. Id. art. 2, para. 3(c).
437. Terrorist Bombings, supra note 430, art. 3. Each State Party shall establish
jurisdiction over the offenses within the Convention "when the offense is committed in the
territory," on board a vessel or aircraft of that State; or "the offense is committed by a
national of that State." Id. art. 6. "A State may also establish jurisdiction over any such
offense when the offense is committed against a national of that State; or the offense is
committed against a State or government facility of that State abroad, including an embassy
or other diplomatic or consular premises of that State; or the offense is committed by a
stateless person who has his or her habitual residence in the territory of that State; or the
offense is committed in an attempt to compel that State to do or abstain from doing any act;
or thc offense is committed on board an aircraft which is operated by the Government of
that State." Id. art. 6, para. 2.
438. Id. art, 8. The offenses under the condition shall be deemed to be included as an
extraditable offense in any extradition treaty between States Parties. Id. art. 9. "A State
Party which makes extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty... may consider this
Convention as a legal basis for extradition." Id. Offenses within the Convention shall not
be considered political offenses for purposes of extradition. Id. art. 11.
439. Id. art. 4(b).
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measure of assistance" in investigations or in criminal or extradition
proceedings.440
There is little doubt that this Convention prohibited the planning and
carrying out of suicide bombings."1 States Parties were required to adopt
domestic legislation criminally condemning acts within the Convention,
particularly "where they were intended or calculated to provoke a state of
terror in the general public, in a group of persons or in particular
persons. '42  Such acts were "under no circumstances justifiable by
considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic,
religious or other similar nature" and were to be punished by penalties
which reflected the "grave nature of this criminal conduct."4' This
significantly negated claims of religious justification for suicide bombing. 4
4
An argument for Palestinian resistance and self-determination also might
be made under Article Nineteen which provided that the Convention shall
not affect rights, obligations and responsibilities of States and individuals
under international law, in particular the purposes and principles of the
Charter of the United Nations and international humanitarian law.445
However, the targeting of civilians cannot be justified under humanitarian
principles and violates the fundamental norms of discrimination between
civilians and combatants as well as the requirement of proportionality
between the resulting military advantage and the harm resulting to non-
combatants. 46
440. Id. art. 10, para. 1.
441. See supra notes 29-35 and accompanying text.
442. Terrorist Bombings, supra note 430, art. 5.
443. Id.
444. See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
445. Terrorist Bombings, supra note 430, art. 19, para. 1. "The activities of armed forces
during an armed conflict .. are not governed by the Convention." Id. art. 19, para. 2.
446. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AND THE
PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY WITHOUT DISTINCTION-ATT7ACKS ON CIVILIANS BY PALESTINIAN
ARMED GROUPS 22-23 (2002). See Protocol I, supra note 340, arts. 48-52. The sustained
utilization of suicide bombing may very well constitute a crime against humanity. See
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra, at 24-25 quoting Rome Statute Of The International
Criminal Court, art. 7, para. 1-2(a), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9, 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998)
[hereinafter Rome Statute]. Article 7, para. 1 defines a crime against humanity as a
specified act of violence or persecution committed "as part of a widespread or systematic
attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack." Id. art. 7,
para. 1. An attack against any civilian population is defined as "a course of conduct
involving the multiple commission of acts"... [of violence or persecution] against any
civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to
commit such attack." Id. art. 7, para. 2(a).
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The Terrorist Bombing Convention included the contemporary
clauses providing for expansive lurtsdlction as well as a requirement that
States either extradite or prosecute offenders.4 A criticism might be
made that the Convention did not extend to purely domestic bombings." '
The Russian Federation continued to warn of the dangers of terrorist
utilization of weapons of mass destruction, radiological material and of
attacks on nuclear power plants.450 These attacks were particularly
attractive since even a modest assault would promote significant fear and
psychological disorientation.
The Draft Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear
Terrorism, which remains under active consideration, made an important
contribution by requiring Signatory States to prohibit "the use or threat of
use of nuclear material, nuclear fuel, radioactive products or waste, or any
other radioactive substances, their radioactive properties or a combination
of radioactive properties with toxic, explosives or other dangerous
properties., 452  The Convention also prohibited the deployment or
destruction of "any nuclear installation, nuclear explosive or radiation-
dissemination devices... [or] manufacture of home-made nuclear devices,
for the purpose of causing death or serious injury to any person or harming
his health, causing substantial damage to property or the environment," or
compelling an individual, group, organization or State to commit or refrain
from the commission of any act.453 There was no requirement under the
Convention that the perpetrator possess a political or terrorist motive.
5 4
A central concern has been the fact that the Convention applied to
individuals and to non-States groups and did not extend to State policies
447. See supra note 437 and accompanying text.
448. See supra note 438 and accompanying text.
449. See supra note 437 and accompanying text.
450. Explanatory Note To The Draft Convention On The Suppression Of Acts Of Nuclear
Terrorism (A/AC.252/L.13) Submitted by the Russian Federation, U.N. Doc.
AIAC.252/L.3/Add.1, paras. 1-2 (Jan. 14, 1998), compiled in I INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM:
A COMPILATION OF U.N. DOCUMENTS, supra note 249, at 659.
451. Id. para. 2. See Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and
Stockpiling Of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction,
Apr. 10, 1972, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163, 26 U.S.T. 583; Convention on the Physical Protection of
Nuclear Material, Mar. 3, 1980, 1456 U.N.T.S. 101, 18 I.L.M. 1419; Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons
and on Their Destruction, May 13, 1993, 1974 U.N.T.S. 3, 32 I.L.M. 800.
452. Draft Convention On The Suppression Of Acts Of Nuclear Terrorism, art. 1(1),
U.N. Doc. A/AC.252/L.3 (1977), compiled in II INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM:
MULTILATERAL CONVENTIONS, supra note 258, at 219 [hereinafter Nuclear Terrorism].
453. Id. art. 1, para. 1(b).
454. See supra notes 352-53.
[Vol. 10.2
THE NEW TERRORISM
involving the proliferation of nuclear weapons, posing of nuclear threats or
nuclear degradation of the environment.
455
The draft Convention contained the now familiar requirement that
456States assert broad jurisdictional claims over such offenses and take
measures to prosecute these offense in those instances in which extradition
of an alleged offender is refused.457 There are broad provisions for StatesS 458
to assist one another in prosecutions and to exchange information in
order to prevent, suppress, uncover and to investigate offenses
encompassed within the Convention.4 59 States also are to take measures to
prevent preparations in their territories for the commission of offenses
within or outside their territories, including illegal activities by persons,
groups or organizations which encourage, instigate, organize or participate
in or conceal nuclear terrorism."'
In 1999, the General Assembly adopted a resolution on Measures to
Eliminate International Terrorism which called upon the Ad Hoc
Committee to continue to elaborate a draft international convention for
the suppression of nuclear terrorism as well as an instrument prohibiting
terrorist financing.461 The Committee also was called upon to consider the
creation of a comprehensive legal framework of instruments regulating
international terrorism, including "considering on a priority basis, the
461
elaboration of a comprehensive convention on international terrorism.
France submitted a memorandum on the financing of terrorism which
stressed that terrorist armament, recruitment and training were dependent
455. See Nuclear Terrorism, supra note 452, art. 2, para. 1. See Report Of The Working
Group, Measures To Eliminate International Terrorism, U.N. D )c. A/C.6/55/L.2 (Oct. 19
2000), compiled in I INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: A COMPILATION OF U.N. DOCUMENTS,
supra note 249, at 827, 845. "This Convention shall apply exclusively to acts by specific
natural persons (in an individual capacity or as part of non-State groups or other
associations) and its scope shall not include the questions of the non-proliferation of
nuclear weapons or [other] threats posed by States, international intergovernmental
organizations or other subjects of international law." Nuclear Terrorism, supra note 452,
art. 2, para. 1.
456. Nuclear Terrorism, supra note 452. States are to assert territorial jurisdiction,
nationality jurisdiction, jurisdiction over acts to compel a State to perform or to refrain
from any act, passive personality or an act directed against a national of a State. Id. art. 5.
457. Id. art. 5, para. 2. The case shall be submitted without undue delay to competent
authorities for the purpose of prosecution and proceedings in accordance with domestic
legislation. Id. art. 7, para. 1.
458. Id. art. 9.
459. Id. art. 11.
460. Id. art. 4(1).
461. G.A. Res. 108, U.N. GAOR, 53d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/53/108 (1999).
462. Id. para. 11.
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on the free flow of illicit sources of funding.41 The Convention for the
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism,4 adopted by the General
Assembly in 1999, required Signatory States to criminally condemn the
provision of funds with the intention that they should be used, or in the
knowledge that they were to be used, to carry out an act violative of aS 465
specified terrorist convention, or any other act intended to cause death
or serious bodily injury to a civilian or to any other person not taking an
active part in an armed conflict, when the purpose is to intimidate a
population or to compel a government or international organization to
perform or refrain from performing any act. 416 This does not encompass
individuals who, in good faith, donated funds to an organization which
467
conveyed the cash to a terrorist group. The Convention, as with other
instruments, is not applicable in those instances in which an offense is
committed within a single State, the alleged offender is a national of that
State and is present in the territory of that State and no other State has a
basis for asserting jurisdiction under the Convention.
The traditional "prosecute" or "extradite" standard also is
469incorporated into the Convention. States Parties are required to take
463. Draft International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism,
Working Document Submitted by France, U.N. Doc. A/AC.252/L.7/Add.1 (1999), compiled
in I INTERNATIONALTERRORISM: A COMPILATION OF U.N. DOCUMENTS, supra note 249, at
778.
464. Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, U.N. Doc. A/54/109
(1999), compiled in II INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: MULTILATERAL CONVENTIONS, supra
note 258, at 231.
465. Explanatory Note to the Draft Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear
Terrorism (A/AC.252/L.13) Submitted by the Russian Federation, paras. 1-2, U.N. Doc.
A/AC.252/L.3/Add.1 (1998), compiled in I INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: A COMPILATION
OF U.N. DOCUMENTS supra note 249, at 659 [hereinafter Explanatory Note].
466. Id. para. 2.
467. See id.
468. Id. para. 3. States Parties shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish
jurisdiction over offenses within the Convention when the offense is committed in the
territory of that State, the offense is committed on board a vessel flying the flag of that
State or an aircraft registered under the laws of that State, the offense is committed by a
national of that State. Id. art. 7, para. 1. A State Party may also establish jurisdiction over
such an offense when the act was directed towards or resulted in the carrying out of an
offense in the territory of or against a national of the State resulted in the carrying out of an
offense against a State or government facility of that State abroad, including diplomatic or
consular premises, the offense was directed or resulted in an offense committed in an
attempt to compel that State to do or to abstain from any act, the offense was committed by
a stateless person whose habitual residence is within the territory of the State or the offense
is committed on board an aircraft operated by the State. Id. art. 7, para. 2.
469. Id. arts. 10-11.
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necessary measures to hold legal entities civilly, criminally or
administratively liable for offenses under the Convention. 70 States Parties
also shall take appropriate measures for the identification, detection and
freezing or seizure of funds used or allocated for the purpose of
contravening the Convention;41 these funds as well as the proceeds derived
from violations of the Convention are subject to forfeiture.7  States
Parties shall consider mechanisms for utilizing such funds to compensate
the victims of terrorist offenses.473 States Parties are to afford one another
the greatest measure of assistance in connection with criminal
investigations or criminal extradition proceedings. Signatories may not
refuse a request for mutual legal assistance on the grounds of bank
475
secrecy. The Convention also includes an inventory of measures for• • 476
insuring transparency in banking regulations.
A central concern with the Convention on the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism is that it does not prohibit the intentional
transmittal of funds to terrorist groups or to terrorist-support groups with
the knowledge that the fund will be used to support the non-terrorist
47
activities of militant groups.
In summary, the contemporary period has witnessed as determination
on behalf of the United Nations to act against international terrorism.
The General Assembly adopted a non-binding resolution condemning and
controlling terrorism as well as resolutions on human rights and
terrorism.4 The United Nations also adopted conventions on terrorist
48 • 482bombings'8' as well as on the financing of terrorist organizations and
470. Id. art. 5.
471. Fxplanary Note, supra note 465, art. 8, para. 1.
472. Id.
473. Id. art. 8, para. 4.
474. Id. art. 12, para. 1.
475. Id. art. 12, para. 2.
476. Id. art. 18. These include the establishment of measures to identify depositors,
monitor large and complex and unusual patterns of transactions and to maintain records.
Id. art. 19, para. 1(b)(iii). States Parties shall further cooperate in the prevention of
offenses by the licensing of money-transmission agencies, and shall undertake measures to
detect or to monitor the physical cross-border transportation of cash and negotiable
instruments. Id. art. 18, para. 2(b).
477. See supra notes 465-67 and accompanying text.
47& See supra notes 382-89 and accompanying text.
479. See supra notes 393-403 and accompanying text.
480. See supra notes 390-91 and accompanying text.
481. See supra notes 430-40 and accompanying text.
482. See supra notes 464-77 and accompanying text.
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made significant progress on prohibiting nuclear terrorism.4 ' These
instruments incorporated progress on the extension of jurisdiction,
extradition and State cooperation.
VI. TOWARDS A COMPREHENSIVE CONVENTION
The momentum mounted for a comprehensive convention on
terrorism .4  In 1996, India transmitted to the Secretary-General for
consideration by Member States a draft international convention on the
suppression of terrorism. 86 The Ad Hoc Committee on Terrorism
appointed by the General Assembly, in 1999, has regularly condemned
terrorism as a threat to international peace and security which constituted
a violation of basic human rights 8 ' States nevertheless have been unable
to agree on the precise parameters of terrorism; various delegates to the
Ad Hoc Committee, for instance, have insisted on differentiating betweenS 488
terrorism and the legitimate right of peoples to resist foreign occupation.
These State delegations, in essence, argued that any consideration and
condemnation of terrorism must be tempered by an appreciation of the
underlying motives and causes of this conduct."s9 Others cautioned against
devolving into a debate which might detract from the accomplishments of
the General Assembly. 490 Another set of States stressed the dangers posed
491by State terrorism. Others emphasized that any definition must note the
particular threat of terrorists aligning themselves with drug traffickers and
492
arms smugglers.
Delegates compromised by endorsing the pragmatic and prudent
approach of addressing particular types of terrorist activity in an
483. See supra notes 452-60 and accompanying text.
484. See supra notes 447-48, 456-57, 468-69 and accompanying text.
485. See infra notes 486-500 and accompanying text.
486. Letter From The Permanent Representative Of India To The United Nations
Addressed To The Secretary-General (Nov. 1, 1996) U.N. Doc. A/C.6/51/6, compiled in I
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: A COMPILATION OF U.N. DOCUMENTS, supra note 249, at 526
[hereinafter Indian Draft I].
487. Report Of The Ad Hoc Committee Established By General Assembly Resolution
51/210 Of 17 December 1996, 4th Sess., para. 16, U.N. Doc. A/55137 (2000), compiled in I
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: A COMPILATION OF U.N. DOCUMENTS supra note 249, at 806








incremental fashion .3  States stressed the importance of international
cooperation in combating terrorism and the ratification of existing
conventions. A significant number advocated drafting a comprehensive
convention on international terrorism"9  which integrated existing
conventions, addressed terrorist threats which heretofore had not been the
subject of international action and established a common legal framework
496for the processing and prosecution of terrorism.
The General Assembly, in 2000, formally voted to appoint a working
group within the Sixth Committee to draft a "comprehensive convention
on international terrorism within a comprehensive legal framework of
conventions dealing with international terrorism. 4 97 The Working Group
agreed that a comprehensive convention should address all aspects of
terrorism, including those not yet encompassed in existing documents.9
In addition, the comprehensive convention should extend the progressive
procedural provisions of more recent documents to offenses not
encompassed within earlier instruments.
499
India distributed a revised draft comprehensive convention at the first
meeting of the Working Group in 2000.500 The preamble to the Indian
draft enumerated existing international conventions, recalled General
Assembly resolutions which adopted measures to eliminate international
terrorism and resolved to take effective measures to prevent terrorism and
to ensure that the perpetrators were subjected to prosecution and
493. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee, supra note 487, para. 17.
494. Id.
495. Id. "The suggestion was made that the Secretariat could offer assistance to States by
serving as a depository of implementing legislation regarding terrorism." Id. para. 19.
496. Id. para. 26. There was lengthy debate on convening a comprehensive conference on
terrorism. Some contended that this would draw attention to the problem of terrorism and
permit discussion of methods of combating terrorism. Id. para. 22. Others warned that this
would invite rhetorical exercise on issues and absorb valuable time and resources. Id. para.
23.
497. Measures To Eliminate International Terrorism, U.N. Doc. A/Res/54/110 (2000),
compiled in I INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: A COMPILATION OF U.N. DOCUMENTS supra
note 249, at 800.
498. Measures To Eliminate International Terrorism: Report of the Working Group,
Annex IV, para. 18, U.N.Doc. A/C.6/L.2 (2000), compiled in I INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM:
A COMPILATION OF U.N. DOCUMENTS, supra note 249, at 827 [hereinafter Report of the
Working Group].
499. Id.
500. Measures To Eliminate International Terrorism: Draft Comprehensive Convention
On International Terrorism, Working Document Submitted By India, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/55/1
(2000), compiled in I INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: A COMPILATION OF U.N. DOCUMENTS
supra note 249, at 814 [hereinafter Indian Draft II].
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punishment."0 ' The preamble also implicitly recognized the suppression of
terrorism, including that sponsored or supported by States, was essential to
the safeguarding of international peace and security.12 Some States
undoubtedly would object that while the preamble condemned terrorism
as endangering innocent lives and human dignity and impinging
fundamental freedoms, that insufficient attention was devoted to
addressing the underlying causes of terrorism and to the aspirations of
peoples fighting for self-determination against colonial and racist
5013
regimes.
Article Two defined terrorism as an unlawful and intentional act
which causes death or serious bodily injury to any person.'O There is some
logic to a provision which is sufficiently broad to encompass a full range of
criminal conduct, but this language is too elastic. The murder of a
common citizen typically is not sufficiently significant to impact upon the
societal psyche unless the act endangered or threatened the public or was
directed against an individual of status, stature or notoriety. This also
seems to preclude hostage-taking, kidnappings and symbolic acts of
violence intended to promote terror.5°6 The second act of terror set forth
in the Convention involved an act intended to cause serious damage or
major economic loss to a government facility, public transportation system
communication network or infrastructure where the purpose of such act
was to "intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an
501. Id. pmbl.
502. Id. Article 18 somewhat obscurely provides that "[njothing in this Convention shall
affect other rights, obligations and responsibilities of States and individuals under
international law, in particular the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United
Nations and international humanitarian law." Id. art. 18, para 1.
503. See Hostage Convention, supra note 353, art. 12.
504. Indian Draft II, supra note 500, art. 2, para. 1(a). The Convention also penalizes an
attempt or acting as an accessory; organizing, directing or instigating others to commit an
offense; aiding, abetting, facilitating or counseling the commission of such an offensc, or
contributing to the commission to an offense within the convention by a group of persons
acting with a common purpose. Id. art. 2. This contribution must be "intentional and either
made with the aim of furthering the general criminal activity or purpose of the group or be
made with the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the offense or offenses
concerned." Id. art. 2, para. (3)(c).
505. See The Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, supra note
258, at 71, art. 2, paras. (1)-(2).
506. See United States Draft Convention For The Prevention And Punishment of Certain
Acts of International Terrorism, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/L.850 (1972), compiled in I




international organization to do or abstain from doing any act."'  The
concern with property appears to be a remnant of the Cold War conflict in
which Socialist States placed a primacy on social and economic rights
rather than civil liberties. 08 The "intimidate or compel" standard nicely
captures the requisite intent which distinguishes terrorism from common
crimes. 5 9 The text should be clarified to make plain that an attack on
ordinary office buildings, public and private monuments or automobiles
and private transport systems are encompassed within the language of this
section.1 An international convention also should be directed at acts
which cause or which are intended to cause serious damage or major
economic loss.5" ' The text stipulates that these offenses shall be
established as criminal offenses under domestic law and are to be punished
by appropriate penalties.! 2 The draft, in Appendix I, enumerated the
international offenses established by existing terrorist conventions which,
together with the offenses in Article Two, were not to be considered as
political crimes which were exempt from extradition.5"3
Article Two illustrates the dilemmas inherent in a comprehensive
convention. The Indian Draft appears to be designed to maximize
ratifications by including a broadly phrased text and stipulating that the
offenses enumerated in existing international instruments shall not be
considered political crimes which are exempt from extradition. 14 There is
no requirement in the draft that States ratify these treaties and recognize
these offenses."' States, under the comprehensive convention, still possess
the discretion to abrogate political offender status while retaining the
authority to refuse to extradite an offender to a requesting State and to
decline to prosecute the offender."6 In any event, the requirement that
507. Indian Draft II, supra note 500, art. 2, para. 1 (b). Purpose may be determined by the
"nature or context" of the act. Id.
508. See generally International Covenant On Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,




512. Indian Draft II, supra note 500, art. 4. See Report of the Working Group, supra note
498, at 827, 831. It was suggested that Article Two should be modified to provide for a
section on death or seriously bodily harm and a second section addressing serious damage
to property. The third section then would address damage to property resulting or likely to
result in major economic loss. Id. art. 11(B).
513. Indian Draft II, supra note 500, art. 14.
514. See id.
515. See supra note 513 and accompanying text.
516. See Indian Draft II, supra note 500, art. 17. A State, for instance, may not have an
extradition agreement with the requesting State. See id. art. 17(2).
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States abrogate political offender status still may impede ratification since
States which have not yet entered into existing particular counter-
terrorism conventions may object to this provision on the grounds that it
improperly interferes with their domestic jurisdiction or denies political
recognition to justified acts of resistance."7 There also is the concern that
so-called State terrorism, which some consider to be of paramountS518
concern, is not explicitly included in the Treaty.
A more comprehensive text which either incorporates existing
instruments by reference or which encompasses their substantive
provisions, on the other hand, likely is to meet resistance from reticent
States. It nevertheless appears preferable to formulate a comprehensive
convention which supercedes and refines existing documents and
incorporates additional manifestations of modern terrorism in order to
provide an international condemnation of terrorist acts, however
symbolic.' 2°
The Convention primarily is concerned with the international
dimension of terrorism and contains the familiar provision that the draft
shall not apply where the offense is committed within a single State, the
alleged offender is a national of that State and is present in the territory of
that State and no other State has a basis to exercise jurisdiction under the
Convention."' This provision implicitly encourages and recognizes the
interest of third-party States in extending their jurisdiction to encompass
acts committed against and by their nationals abroad as well as acts
undertaken abroad which are directed against their regime."' The result is
that acts of pure domestic terrorism are excluded from the scope of the
convention and are considered beyond the scope of the influence and
• • 523
control of the international community.
517. See supra notes 347-62 and accompanying text.
518. See generally Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 197
(Annex), U.N. Doc. AJ9/51 (1985), reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1027 (1984). The conduct of
States, of course, already is addressed in existing documents, See Convention on The
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
519. See Unofficial Draft Comprehensive Convention on the International Suppression of
Terrorism, compiled in II INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: MULTILATERAL CONVENTIONS,
supra 258, at 263 (this draft was formulated by Professor Bassiouni and others and
incorporated the offenses contained in existing international treaties).
520. See id.
521. Indian Draft II, supra note 500, art. 3. This was modified to require that the alleged
offender and the victims were nationals of a single State. See Report of the Working
Group, supra note 498, at 827, 829.




Each State Party shall adopt those measures which may be necessary
in order to establish as criminal offenses the offenses set forth in Article
Two which, as noted, are to be punishable by appropriate penalties. 24 The
Convention also might set forth parameters of the range of punishments as
well as the correctional conditions and status to which those incarcerated
may be subjected."' In addition, Article Four should address the
availability of the statute of limitations as well as various common law
defenses such as duress and necessity and double jeopardy.52 Criminal
acts under the Convention may not be justified on the basis of a
philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic or religious claim.527 The issue
arises whether these factors may be considered in mitigation of
128punishment. It also would be desirable to specify the character and
conduct of the relevant domestic tribunals which may be employed and
521
minimal due process protections and procedures.
Article Six requires States to assert an expansive jurisdictional basis
over offenses within the Convention based on the territorial, nationality
and protective principles530 and also provides broad provisions for
permissive jurisdiction."3' States Parties also shall take such measures as
may be necessary to assert jurisdiction over offenses in those instances in
which the alleged offender is present in its territory and where it does not
extradite the individual with a State which possesses jurisdiction under the
532Convention. This ensures that there is a State with a legal interest in
bringing alleged terrorists to trial.533 The difficulty of competing
jurisdictional claims, of course, arises and the Convention merely
524. Id.
525. Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, E.S.C. Res. 663, 24 U.N.
ESCOR, Supp. No. 1, at 11, Doc. A/CONF./6/1, U.N. Doc, E/3048 (1957).
526. See Indian Draft II, supra note 500, art. 3.
527. Id. art. 5.
528. See id.
529. See id.
530. Id. art 6, para. 1. Protective jurisdiction provides legal authority and competence
when the effect of extra-territorial conduct or the intended effect of such occur within a
State's territory. Id. art. 6, para. 1(c).
531. Id. art. 6, para. 2. A State may establish its jurisdiction over any such offense when it
is committed by a stateless person whose habitual residence is in that state; it is committed
by a national of that State: it is committed against a State or government facility of that
State abroad, including an embassy or other diplomatic or consular premises of that State;
it is committed in an attempt to compel that State to do or to abstain from doing any act, it
is committed on board a ship or aircraft which is operated by the Government of that State.
Id. art. 6, para. 2.
532. Id. art. 6, para. 3.
533. See Id. art. 6.
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admonishes States to coordinate their "actions appropriately. '53 4 It may be
more expedient to provide for universal jurisdiction, or the recognition of
the claims of any and all countries, rather than engage in this catalogue of
complex and competing jurisdictional provisions and claims.3 ' At the
same time, there are obvious difficulties with States asserting jurisdiction
in cases in which witnesses, documents and evidence is located abroad. 36
The most logical solution to many of these potential complex and
competing jurisdictional claims is to vest jurisdiction in the newly-
established international criminal court.3
The provision for broadly-based jurisdiction is particularly important
given the reluctance of States who fear retaliation to prosecute foreign
terrorist groups operating within their territory and, in such instances,
negotiation may be a much more attractive alternative."' Weak central
States often lack mechanisms to apprehend or to prosecute terrorists while
so-called rogue States often provide safe havens for terrorists and are
likely to refuse extradition or to deny the presence of terrorists.
5 39
Terrorist organizations are fluid, flexible and global and effective
cooperation between States is particularly important.5 40 The large number
of individuals who are involved in supporting and organizing terrorist
activity also makes the provision of accessory liability an important
component of any treaty on terrorism.41
The Convention provides that States Parties shall take the necessary
measures to hold legal entities located in their territory or organized under
their laws liable in those instances in which an individual responsible for
the organization's management or control has committed an offense within
542
the Convention. These remedies may be effective, proportionate anddissuasive criminal, civil or administrative sanctions and may include
534. Id. art. 6, para. 4.
535. See Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law, 66 TEx. L.
REV. 785 (1988).
536. Id.
537. See Rome Statute, supra note 446.
538. See generally SIMON REEVE, ONE DAY IN SEPTEMBER (2000). An example is
Germany's implicit arrangement to release those Palestinians who participated in the
hostage-taking and killing of Israeli athletes at the 1972 Munich Olympics. Id. 155-59.
539. See RAYMOND TANTER, ROUGE REGIMES: TERRORISM AND PROLIFERATION (St.
Martin's Griffin 1999).
540. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
541. See supra note 290 and accompanying text.
542. Indian Draft II, supra note 500, art. 9. This "liability is incurred without prejudice to
the criminal liability of individuals having committed the offense." Id. art. 9, para. 2.
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monetary sanctions.' 4  There also might be provision for civil remedies
against individuals associated with terrorist groups as well as actionable
claims against State sponsors.'" The specific measures for the freezing and
forfeiture of funds contained in the Convention on the Financing of
Terrorism also should be explicitly set forth.545 These concerns should be
explicitly linked to the creation of domestic and international funds for the
compensation of victims of terrorism as well as to measures which insure
. 46
the fair and equitable treatment of victims and their familes.
Article Seven, which provides that States Parties shall take
appropriate measures before granting asylum to ensure that asylum is not
granted to an individual reasonably believed to be involved in terrorism,
might be extended to encompass the immigration and the movements of
peoples across borders.547 States Parties also shall take all "practicable
measures" to prevent and to counter preparations in their territories for
the commission of acts of terrorism, both within and outside theirt .. 548
territories. This includes a prohibition on terrorist installations and
training camps;549 prevention of illegal activities to encourage, instigate,
organize or finance or engage in terrorism;" and efforts to exchange
• r ., 551
accurate and verified information. This, of course, may impinge upon
protected activities and might be combined with an admonition that the
countering of terrorism does not justify the impingement of human
rights."' States also might be required to engage in programs of education
concerning the benefits of social diversity and tolerance as well as the
consequences of terrorism and Signatory States also should be expected to
take affirmative steps to eradicate the socio-economic conditions which
foster terrorism . 53
States Parties also are required to investigate allegations that
individuals present within their territory have engaged in acts of
543. Id. art. 9, para. 3.
544. See ALLAN GERSON & JERRY ADLER, THE PRICE OF TERROR 103 (Harper Collins
2001).
545. See supra notes 465-76 and accompanying text.
546. See generally ORIGINS OF TERRORISM, supra note 8. The literature primarily has
been devoted to the psychology of victimizers rather than victims. See id.
547. See Indian Draft II, supra note 500, art. 7.
548. Id. art. 8(a).
549. Id. art. 8(a)(i)
550. Id. art. 8(a)(ii).
551. Id. art. 8(b).
552. See supra notes 379-80 and accompanying texts.
553. See Colonial Countries and Peoples, supra note 337.
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terrorism.554 In the event that the requisite evidentiary basis is satisfied,
States Parties shall take appropriate measures under their domestic law to
detain the individuals for the purpose of prosecution or extradition.
Detainee shall be entitled to meet with a representative of their State of
116
nationality. The detaining State shall notify other countries with
jurisdictional claims over the alleged perpetrator. States Parties are
expected to afford one another the "greatest measure of assistance" in
conducting investigations or criminal or extradition proceedings.5 8
A State Party in whose territory an alleged offender is detained, shall
either extradite the offender or submit the case to its competent
authorities for the purpose of prosecution."' The decision whether to
prosecute shall be made in accordance with the procedures utilized in the
case of any "ordinary offence of a grave nature under the law of that
State."56° This provision makes extradition discretionary which raises the
concern that offenders who are not extradited either will avoid prosecution
or will be prosecuted for relatively modest offenses or receive a lenient
sentence.561
Article Fourteen provides that the offenses enumerated in the
Convention as well as in other terrorist instruments shall not be considered
562political offenses for purposes of extradition or mutual legal assistance.
This appears to be based on view that a political motive or exigency, under
no circumstances, may justify the commission of terrorist offenses. 63 The
narrowing of State discretion over extradition is counter-balanced by
Article Fifteen which provides that there shall be no obligation to extradite
individuals in those instances in which the request has been motivated by a
554. Indian Draft I, supra note 500, art 10(1).
555. Id. art. 10(2).
556. Id. art. 10(3).
557. Id. art. 10(6). Persons taken into custody or subjected to any other measures or
proceedings under the Convention shall be guaranteed fair treatment, including enjoyment
of all rights and guarantees in conformity with the law of the State in which the individual is
detained and in conformity with the laws of the United States. Id. art. 12.
558. Id. art. 13(1).
559. Id. art. 11(1).
560. Indian Draft II, supra note 500.
561. Id. A State Party which only is authorized to extradite a national on the condition
that the detainee will be returned to the State to serve the sentence imposed as a result of
the trial or proceeding for which the extradition or surrender was sought, may extradite the
offender under the Convention on the grounds that the individual will be returned to serve
his or her sentence. Id. art. 11(2).
562. Id. art. 14.
563. See id. In addition to the two offenses set forth in Article Two; the offenses set forth
in twelve terrorism treaties are not considered political offenses. See Annex 1.
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desire to prosecute individuals based on their background or views. 56
There are a number of standard provisions which seek to overcome
technical and procedural barriers which might impede or prevent the
extradition of offenders."'
Article Sixteen establishes procedures for transferring detainees to
third party State for purposes of identification, testimony or otherwise
providing assistance in obtaining evidence for the prosecution of offenses
under the Convention.16' There also should be a prohibition on a State
transferring detainees to a third-party State whose judicial and police
procedures contravene due process principles pertaining to interrogation
567
or to the treatment of detainees. Disputes concerning the interpretation
or application of the instrument which cannot be settled through
negotiation may be referred, at the request of one of the parties, to
arbitration with an appeal to the International Court of Justice.'6 It also
would appear advisable to establish a permanent committee on terrorism
under the Convention to receive State reports and to monitor compliance
with the terms of the treaty. 569
The Indian proposal provides a foundation for a comprehensive
• 570
convention on international terrorism. The draft treaty's most glaring
weakness appears to be the limited definition of terrorism.7 ' The
instrument, however, is a significant step towards the creation of a system
564. Id. art. 15.
565. See id. art. 15, para. 17. The offenses under the Convention shall be deemed to be
included as an extraditable offense in any extradition treaty between any of the States
Parties before the entry into force of the Convention. Id. art. 17(1). A State may consider
the Convention as a legal basis for extradition in the event that there is no extradition
treat, between the requesting and receiving States. Id. art. 17(2). States which do not make
extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty shall recognize the offenses set forth in
the Treaty as extraditable offenses between themselves. Id. art. 17(3). The provisions of
extradition treaties shall be deemed to be modified as between States Parties to the extent
that they are incompatible with the Convention. Id. art. 17(5). See id. Annex IlI
(Extradition Procedure).
566. Indian Draft II, supra note 500, art. 16. See Annex II (Procedure for mutual legal
assistance). Mutual legal assistance may be requested for taking evidence or statements;
effecting service of judicial documents; executing searches and seizures; examining objects
and sites; providing information and evidentiary items; providing original or certified copies
of relevant documents and records; and identifying or tracing proceeds, property,
instrumentalities or other items for evidentiary purposes. Id. art. 2 (Annex 1I).
567. See id. art. 16.
568. See id. art. 23(1).
569. See generally International Covenant On Civil And Political Rights, arts. 28, 40-43,
993 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967).
570. See supra notes 500-69 and accompanying text.
571. See supra notes 504-11 and accompanying text.
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of international cooperation and mutual assistance for combating
572
multinational terrorist violence. There no doubt will be States which
resist signing or ratifying a comprehensive treaty.573 An instrument of this
nature nevertheless may highlight the international community's
condemnation of terrorism, place States which sponsor terrorism on the
defensive and assist in the creation of an international customary
574denunciation of terrorism.
VII. THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL
The United Nations Security Council convened on September 12,
2001 following the attack on the United States and proclaimed that
terrorism was crime against the international community.5 75  Secretary-
General Kofi Anan expressed solidarity with the American government
and denounced terrorism as an international scourge which has been
condemned by the United States and which constituted an attack on
"humanity as a whole. '5 76 Sir Jeremy Greenstock noted that "terrorism is
the new evil in our world today, perpetrated by fanatics who are utterly
indifferent to the sanctity of human life. 5 77 He noted that September l1th
constituted an attack on the "whole of modern civilization" and that the
international community must "respond globally and show the strength
of... spirit. 578 Mr. Ryan of Ireland affirmed that "no cause that is based
on mass murder and carnage can ever succeed.., those who perpetrate
such deeds are the enemies of all peoples everywhere. '" 7 9  Those
responsible for this "barbarism" were the "enemies of peace and justice"
and must be "brought to justice and the entire international community
must work together towards this end. ,511 Mr. Lavrov of Russia proclaimed
that the attack on the United States "transcends national borders. It is a
brazen challenge to all of humankind. 5 81  Mr. Kolby of Norway
572. See supra notes 548-53 and accompanying text.
573. Indian Draft II, supra note 500, art. 25(1). The Convention shall enter force thirty
days after twenty-two instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession have
been deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Id.
574. See id. pmbl.
575. U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4370th mtg., at 1, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4370 (2001), compiled in I
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: A COMPILATION OF U.N. DOCUMENTS, Supra note 249, at 61.
576. Id. at 2.
577. Id.
578. Id.
579. Id. at 5.
580. Id.
581. U.N. SCOR, supra note 575.
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proclaimed that this "shameless terror was an effort to undermine the
values that constitute the very foundations of the civilized world. The
attacks were therefore directed against all of us. 5 182 The President of the
Security Council, Mr. Levitte of France, called for "unity and resolve" in




The Security Council proceeded to adopt Resolution 1368 and
condemned in the "strongest terms the horrifying attacks" which took
place on September 11, 2001'8 and expressed its "deepest sympathy" and
"condolences." 58 The resolution called upon States to work together to
bring the perpetrators and organizers and sponsors of these terrorist acts
to justice and to hold the offenders accountable."' The international
community was called upon to increase its efforts to prevent and to
suppress terrorist acts, including implementation of the relevant
• . 587
international anti-terrorist conventions and Security Council resolutions.
Most importantly, the Council expressed a willingness to take the
necessary steps to combat all forms of terrorism, in accordance with "its
responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations.,
58
On September 28, 2002, the United Nations Security Council adopted
Resolution 1373 which reaffirmed the need to combat, by all means, the
threat to international peace and security caused by terrorism.58 9  This
textual language significantly shifted the discussion of terrorism from
human rights and self-determination to threats to international peace and
security under the jurisdiction of the United Nations Security Council9
States also were called upon to prevent and to suppress the financing of
terrorist acts5 9 and to freeze the financial assets related to terrorist
causes.592 Criminal penalties were to be imposed on individuals involved in
the solicitation and collection of funds for terrorist activities593 and for
582. Id. at 6.
583. Id. at 7.
584. U.N. SCOR, Res. 1368, 56th Sess.. 4370th mtg., para. 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368
(2001).
585. Id. para. 2.
586. Id. para. 3.
587. Id. para. 4.
588. Id. para. 5.
589. U.N. SCOR, Res. 1373, 56th Sess., 4385th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (2001),
available at http://www.un.org/terrorism (last visited Feb. 11, 2003).
590. Id. The resolution stated that the Security Council was acting under Chapter VII of
the Charter of the United Nations. Id. See U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
591. S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 589, para. 1(a).
592. Id. para. 1(c).
593. Id. para. 1(b).
2003]
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
making finances or services available to terrorists or entities owned or
under the control of terrorists.5 94
States also were to take the necessary steps to prevent the commission
of terrorist acts, including information sharing and alerting other States.9
In addition, States were to deny safe haven to individuals involved in
terrorist activity... and were to insure that terrorist acts were established as
criminal offenses, that the punishment reflected the seriousness of such
acts and that individuals who committed these terrorist offenses were
brought to justice.' 97 States also were to afford one another the "greatest
measure" of assistance in criminal investigations and proceedings relating
to terrorist acts.598 In addition, terrorists and terrorist groups should be
prevented from moving across boundaries through effective controls on
borders, the issuance of identity papers and travel documents and through
measures for the prevention of document fraud counterfeiting and
forgery.'g
States also were called upon to intensify and to accelerate the
exchange of information regarding terrorism, forged documents, illicit
traffic in weapons and explosives and the methods of conspiratorial
communication and weapons of mass destruction.& They also were to
enter into bilateral and multilateral agreements to prevent and to suppress
terrorist acts 1 and to sign and to ratify the relevant international
conventions and protocols.602 In addition, regimes were to ensure that
asylum and refugee status were not extended to individuals involved in
terrorism.6°3
The resolution also noted the close connection between terrorism and
transnational organized crime, illicit drugs, money laundering, illegal arms
trafficking and the illicit movement of nuclear, chemical, biological and
other potentially deadly materials. 6 4 The Security Council stressed the
necessity of coordinating efforts on the national, sub-regional, regional and
594. Id. para. 1(d).
595. Id. para. 2(a).
596. Id. para. 2(c).
597. S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 589, para. 2(e).
598. Id. para. 2(f).
599. Id. para. 2(g).
600. Id. para. 3(a).
601. Id. para. 3(c)
602. Id. para 3(d).
603. S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 589, para. 3(f)-(g).
604. Id. para. 4.
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international levels in order to strengthen the global response to terrorist
threats.6, 5
The Security Council created a Counter-Terrorism Committee,
consisting of all members of the Council, charged with monitoring the
implementation of the resolution. 6 Member States were to report to the
Committee within ninety days on the measures which they had taken to
implement the resolution.60 ' The Security Council concluded by expressing
the determination to "take all necessary steps in order to ensure the full
implementation" of the resolution 'in accordance with its responsibilities
under the Charter.
608
The Security Council, convened at the ministerial level, proceeded to
adopt Resolution 1377.' 6 This affirmed Resolution 1373 and declared that
international terrorism represented a serious threat to international peace
and to individual as well as to collective security and was contrary to the
principles of the United Nations Charter.61° The main body of the
resolution invited the Counter-Terrorism Committee to promote
sophisticated approaches to addressing the areas encompassed by
Resolution 1373, including the preparation of model laws;6 and the
availability and "possible synergies" between technical assistance612
programs. The Resolution concluded by calling on States to intensify
their efforts to eliminate the "scourge of international terrorism. 613
At the 4453 meeting of the Security Council, Sir Jeremy Greenstock,
Head of the Counter-Terrorism Committee, proclaimed that Resolution
1373 imposed a binding obligation on all States to suppress and to prevent
terrorism and that the function of the Counter-Terrorism Committee was
to monitor the implementation of the measures required under this
resolution and under existing anti-terrorist instruments.614 He stressed that
the mandate of the Committee was to enhance government performance
in the struggle against terrorism and to insure that the executive and
legislative branches of all countries were equipped to effectively
605. Id.
606. Id. para. 6.
607. Id.
608. Id. para. 8.
609. Id. See U.N. SCOR, Res. 1377, 56th Sess., 4413th mtg., U.N. Doc S/RES/1377





614. U.N. SCOR, Res. 1373, 57th Sess., 4453d mtg., at 4, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4453 (2002),
available at http://un.org/terrorism.
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implement the program of action."' A critical part of this effort, as noted
by some delegates, was to advocate increased domestic and regional efforts
to combat terrorism and to encourage cooperation at the regional level
among States with common cultural and historical traditions."' Sir Jeremy
reported that the Committee already had invited States and regional
organizations to contribute to a directory of available technical assistance;
selected independent experts to advise the Committee; and requested the
Secretary-General to establish a trust fund to support anti-terrorist
611
activities. Sir Jeremy further reported that guidelines had been issued to
direct States in drafting reports and that an impressive 125 State reports
had thus far been received. 8 He also assured the Security Council that
the Counter-Terrorism Committee would work in an open and cooperative
capacity and that he would continue to brief delegates on developments9
Sir Jeremy explained that the Counter-Terrorism Committee would
review the reports and write in confidence to the governments concerned,
offering constructive comments.620 This might entail a request for
additional information, clarification or suggestions as to areas in which
621legislation or further executive measures were required. Sir Jeremy
stressed that this was a long-term and evolving process of adaptation and
adjustment and that it was unlikely that any State would be declared in full
compliance. 6 ' He stressed that the Counter-Terrorism Committee planned
to function through consensus and to evaluate States' overall performance
and had no intention of formulating a definition of terrorism, compiling
lists of terrorists organizations or condemning specific acts of alleged
terrorism. 23 Sir Jeremy pointed out that the authority to address specific
acts which posed a threat to the peace was vested in the Security Council.
624
He also observed that the Committee was guided by Resolution 1373 and
by twelve existing international conventions and that none of these texts
referred to State terrorism which already was adequately addressed under










624. Id. at 24.
625. Id. at 24-25.
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Sir Jeremy reviewed the performance of the Counter-Terrorism
Committee at the 4512th meeting of the Security Council, on April 15,
1262002. He noted that the Committee had received 143 reports and almost
one-half of the States had received a response.12' The Committee was
128
contacting the roughly fifty States which had yet to submit materials.
States were expected to submit a second-round of reports and Sir Jeremy
stated that the Committee intended to be direct and forthcoming in
inquiring into the plans of States for addressing issues of concern and that
the Committee would recommend sources of assistance.619 He also
announced that the Counter-Terrorism Committee had established contact
with the High Commissioner for Human Rights in order to remain aware
of civil liberties and humanitarian concerns in the campaign to curtail
terrorism. In addition, Sir Jeremy expressed his intention to contact
relevant agencies, such as the International Civil Aviation Organization,
611
which might assist in identifying required initiatives and reforms.
Sir Jeremy further noted that the failure of fifty States to submit
reports likely was explained by these regimes' lack of resources and
expertise, a deficiency which could be cured through the assistance of third
632party States and experts. He pointed to and praised Norway which
announced that it would lend assistance to the Organization of African
States.61' At the 4561st meeting of the Security Council, on June 27, 2002,
Sir Jeremy noted that the Counter-Terrorism Committee was developing
"benchmarks" to evaluate the performance of States.
634
The Counter-Terrorism Committee's activities were the subject of
debate and discussion by the Security Council.635 At the November 12,
2002 meeting of the Council, the President, Mr. Knight of Jamaica,
626. U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4512th mtg., at 2, U.N. Doc. S/PV. 4512 (2002), available at
http://www.un.org/terrorism (last visited Feb. 7, 2003).
627. Id.
628. Id.
629. Id. at 3.
630. Id.
631. Id.
632. U.N. SCOR, 4512th mtg., supra note 626, at 25.
633. Id.
634. U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4561st mtg., at 20, U.N. Doc. S/PV. 4561 (2002), available at
http://www.un.org/terrorism (last visited Feb. 7, 2003). See also Guidance for the
Submission of Reports Pursuant to Paragraph 6 of Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001)
of 28 September 2001, para. 1.2, available at http://www.un.org/terrorism (last visited Feb. 7,
2003). See also Reports By Member States, available at http://www.un.org/Doc
s/sc/committees/1373/1l373reportsEng.htm.
635. U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4370th-4688th mtgs., available at http://www.org/terrrorism
(last visited Feb. 7, 2003).
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reported that although Resolution 1373 provided a framework for action
636that there remained a need to define terrorism and to formulate a
comprehensive convention. There also was a continuing need to address
the issues which gave rise to terrorism, including poverty, regional conflict,
the denial of human rights, a lack of access to justice and equal protection
of the law, and a failure to provide for sustainable development and
environmental protection. Mr. Knight also stressed, in his capacity as
Foreign Minister of Jamaica, the responsibility of regional and sub-
regional organizations to implement Resolution 1373 and to strengthen the
coordinated international response against terrorism, transnational crime,
and illicit drugs, money-laundering and illegal arms trafficking.' 39
In summary the Counter-Terrorism Committee established as its goal
the mobilization of State action against terrorism and the creation of a
multinational anti-terrorist culture and infrastructure. The provision of
experts and assistance to States was a significant step in strengthening the
capacity of the global community to combat terrorism.641 The concern with
the financing of terrorism, the movement across borders, the illicit
shipment of arms, judicial cooperation and agreements to share
information and resources also wisely focused on the institutional and legal
architecture which must be strengthened in order to repress terrorist• • 642
activity. The Counter-Terrorism Committee also would be well-advised
to continue to encourage the employment of regional expertise and643
resources and should serve the valuable function of coordinating the
efforts of various international, regional and national agencies and
groups.6 Of course, a great deal of terrorist activity is facilitated by rogue
or weak States which are unlikely to be willing or able to cooperate and
636. U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4413th mtg., at 3, U.N. S/PV./4413 (2001) (statement of
Security Council President Knight, Jamaica), available at http://www.un.org/terrorism (last
visited Feb. 7, 2003).
637. Id.
638. Id. at 4.
639. Id. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Mr. Igor Invanov,
stressed the need to complete work on an international convention on nuclear terrorism. Id.
at 11.
640. See supra notes 606-34 and accompanying text.
641. U.N. SCOR, 4453d mtg., supra note 614, at 5 (remarks of Mr. Ling, Belarus).
642. Id. at 11-13 (remarks of Mr. Arias, Spain).
643. Id.
644. U.N. SCOR, 4453d mtg., supra note 614, at 3 (remarks of the Security Council




which may be available as sponsors and safe havens for terrorist groups.
These are the States which should be the focus of international agitation
and attention.646
Ironically, States which are engaged in the systematic violation of
human rights are likely to have the most effective, if not totalitarian,
mechanisms for controlling terrorism.647 The failure to provide even a
loose definition of terrorism invites these countries to repress democratic
648
elements under the guise of combating terrorism. This danger is
compounded by the Counter-Terrorism Committee's decision to center on
terrorism in isolation from the political context of such activity and a
concern with human rights.649
At the same time, a focus on terrorism, while overlooking the
fundamental socio-economic causes of violence and neglecting to address
regional tensions and the threat to the peace presented by weapons of
mass destruction, is a self-defeating strategy.650 The Counter-Terrorism
Committee has decided to view the struggle against terrorism as a
technical task in order to limit the pernicious perils of political posturing
and ideology. 6 1 This is a rational and pragmatic approach whose success
will rest upon the willingness of States to set aside ideological and
612
territorial aspirations and tensions.
The Committee's success in encouraging formal action against
terrorism, in the end, must be evaluated in light of the ability and
willingness of individual States to act against terrorism and to refrain from
653
the sponsorship of terrorist attacks. There also must be an effort to
educate the global community on the impact of terrorism and to challenge
645. Id. at 9 (statement of Mr. Enkhsaikhan, Mongolia).
646. See id.
647. See Letter from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee Established
Pursuant to Resoultion 1373 (2001) Concerning Counter-terrorism Addressed to the
President of the Security Council (Dec. 28, 2001), U.N. Doc. S/2001/1323 (2001), available
at http://www. un.org/terrorism.
648. U.N. SCOR, 4453d mtg., supra note 614, at 4 (statement of Mr. Chowdhury,
Bangledesh).
649. U.N. SCOR, 4512th mtg., supra note 626, at 2 (statement of Mr. Niehaus, Costa
Rica).
650. U.N. SCOR, 4453d mtg., supra note 614, at 3 (statement of Mr. Loonjul, Mauritius).
651. See supra notes 623-25 and accompanying text.
652. Cf. U.N. SCOR, 4453d mtg., supra note 614, at 8-9 (statement of Mr. Mekdad,
Syria). Of course, some may contend that the exclusion of political considerations from
evaluating the justifiability of terrorism, is, itself, a political partisan stance. Cf U.N.
SCOR, 4512th mtg., supra note 626, at 4 (statement of Mr. Cengizer, Turkey).
653. See Reports By Member States, available at http://ww.u.n.org/terrorism.
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ideological justifications for violence 61 while simultaneously working to
lessen ethnic, racial and territorial tensions and taking significant steps to
control weapons of mass destruction and to promote economic
development."' Finally, terrorism cannot be combated in isolation from
the traffic in illicit drugs, arms, metals and illegal immigration and sexual
exploitation and international organized crime, all of which partially fund
and are inter-related with terrorist activity."'
VIII. CONCLUSION
Global society is witnessing a new world order based on the struggle
against terrorism. 61' This "new terrorism" is characterized by religiously
motivated apocalyptic movements committed to anomic violence and to
the devastating destruction resulting from the deployment of weapons of
mass destruction. The touchstone of this "new terrorism" is the super-
651terrorist who is committed to leaving a malevolent murderous mark.
The most threatening variant of the global terrorist threat is the
660
martyrdom of the suicide bomber.
The draft of the Conference on the Unification of Penal Law66' and
the League of Nations Convention of 1937 for the Prevention and
Punishment of Terrorism primarily provided protection to Heads of
662States. The United Nations' early efforts in the field of terrorism were
limited to admonishing countries to refrain from violating the sovereign
integrity of third party States.66' The advent of attacks on aircraft led the
United Nations to draft a series of treaties protecting the safety and
security of aerial transport.664 An instrument also was adopted to protect
diplomats from an escalating series of attacks. The rise of anti-
166
colonialism and the self-determination of peoples was reflected in the
654. U.N. SCOR, 4453d mtg., supra note 614, at 9 (statement of Mr. Enkhsaikhan,
Mongolia).
655. See id. at 10-11 (statement of Mr. Niehaus, Costa Rica).
656. See id. at 10. See also id. at 11 (statement of Miss Durant, Jamaica).
657. See supra notes 1-40 and accompanying text.
658. See supra notes 44-52 and accompanying text.
659. See supra notes 58-98 accompanying text.
660. See supra notes 99-205 and accompanying text.
661. See supra notes 249-56 and accompanying text.
662. See supra notes 257-68 and accompanying text.
663. See supra notes 269-74 and accompanying text.
664. See supra notes 275-322 and accompanying text.
665. See supra notes 323-35 and accompanying text.
666. See supra notes 337-39 and accompanying text.
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provision of the Hostage Convention which seemingly exempted groups
engaged in political struggles from coverage.667 These early documents
created the basic architecture for international anti-terrorism treaties by
addressing and highlighting issues such as extradition, jurisdiction and
668
cooperation between Signatory Parties.
In the contemporary era, major initiatives have been taken to combat
terrorism, including treaties prohibiting terrorist bombing669 and financial
assistance to terrorists67° as well as a draft on nuclear terrorism."' There
also has been significant progress in the drafting of a comprehensive
convention on terrorism which would coordinate national, regional and
672international efforts. Steps also have been taken to create a system of
standardized State reports under the auspices of the Counter-Terrorism
Committee. 6" The latter recognizes that combating terrorism largely is a
matter of domestic initiative and of homeland security.6 74 The United
Nations Policy Working Group on Terrorism, in September 2002, urged
the organization to focus its efforts at those areas in which the
organization's efforts would prove most effective in the struggle againstS 675
terrorism. This strategy included a stress on legal and non-legal anti-
terrorist norm buildings through the drafting and ratification of.. 676 • . 677
international anti-terrorist instruments and human rights initiatives;
678
the communication of anti-terrorist messages and values, the building of
domestic anti-terrorist regimes through the activities of the Counter-
Terrorism Committee, 679 disarmament initiatives pertaining to weapons of
6 . 681mass destruction so and coordination with regional organizations as well
612
as within the United Nations.
667. See supra notes 353-56 and accompanying text.
668. See supra notes 288-89 and accompanying text.
669. See supra notes 429-40 and accompanying text.
670. See supra notes 464-76 and accompanying text.
671. See supra notes 452-60 and accompanying text.
672. See supra notes 500-69 and accompanying text.
673. See supra notes 614-25 and accompanying text.
674. See supra notes 620-23 and accompanying text.
675. Report of the Policy Working Group on the United Nations and Terrorism, A/57273
(Annex), S/2002/875, at 7, para. 9 (2002), available at http://www.un.org/terrorism.
676. Id. (recommendations 1-3).
677. Id. (recommendations 4-6).
678. Id. (recommendations 7-12).
679. Id. (recommendations 13-17).
680. Id. (recommendations 18-24).
681. Id. (recommendations 25-29).
682. Id. (recommendations 30-31).
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The acceleration of counter-terrorist activity, while heartening, may
not be sufficient to effectively address the looming threat. There are too
many weak and rogue States which may undermine this effort. At the
same time, it is clear that virtually every concern has become subordinated
to the struggle to eliminate the threat of global terrorism and that political
posturing gradually is being replaced by a clarity of conviction and moral
purpose. The issue remains whether the war on terrorism may undermine
the very values which the international community so nobly seeks to
protect .6 8 3
A serious and sustained assault on terrorism would be assisted by a
comprehensive convention which highlighted and amplified the
commitment of the international community. States would be placed
under pressure to ratify the treaty and to accept a uniform set of practices
and procedures pertaining to the prosecution and punishment of terrorism.
This would insure that terrorism was a matter of international priority
whose discipline and disposition would no longer be considered a matter of
State discretion and parochial partisanship. Protection from terrorism is
an essential aspect of human rights and a comprehensive set of anti-
terrorist accords is a prerequisite to the promotion of the dignity of
humankind.6s
683. See DAVID COLE & JAMES X. DEMPSEY, TERRORISM & THE CONSTITUTION (2000).
684. See generally TERRORISM AND THE LAW (Yonah Alexander & Edgar H. Brenner
eds., 2001).
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